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The Italians at War

II. *Realities*

How the Italians were caught in the Nazi war machine

By MARIAN T. ABBAGNANO

DURING the week after the Italian declaration of war, several things happened which did not subdue officialdom in their delirious enthusiasm, but did bring the bulk of the population back to earth immediately. The offensive on the French frontier, against a France already overrun by German troops, brought no results save an advance of a mile or two in a few sectors. The cities of northern Italy had air-raid alerts three or four times every day, with an occasional bomb here and there and a superficial though panicky disorganization of activity. And the anti-aircraft defenses, the magnificent U.N.P.A. (*Unione Nazionale Protezione Antiaerea*), which had been made so much of in the papers, turned out to be an utter fiasco. They sounded the sirens as the bombers were leaving the town, or mistook bombing for thunder claps and vice versa, or showered shells in the middle of the cities. (Everybody laughed at them and hummed "unpa-pa, unpa-pa" to the tune of a waltz.) The fascist plan for autarky had blathered much about the coal production from Sardinia which would enable industry to carry on in case of war. Only a slight detail had been forgotten which emerged immediately after the tenth of June: there were British submarines in the Mediterranean, so no coal from Sardinia arrived. (The fact that Sardinia produces enough coal to keep perhaps two factories going at a time, and that it is of very poor quality, had been completely overlooked.) Such episodes as these caused people to realize with remarkable alacrity that their enthusiasm had been untimely.

On June 17 France asked for an armistice from Germany; on the twenty-first it was concluded. On the twenty-second, when the French delegates were in Rome to discuss the armistice with Italy, a new offensive was launched by the Italian troops in the direction of Nice; on the twenty-fourth, the armistice was concluded. Till the last minute, it was brazenly evident that Mussolini wanted to conquer some ground at all costs, so as not to appear too miserable in Hitler's eyes.

On the eighteenth, the two chiefs had met in Munich to discuss the French armistice. From Mussolini's point of view, it was all over too soon. His one grand chance had arrived; he had doused the public with claims about Corsica, Biserta, Djibouti, Tunisia, the chains in the Mediterranean, the grandeur and military glory which he was bringing to Italy. In ten days the whole thing was over, his marvellous army having conquered only a few square miles against an already defeated country. Officialdom was bellowing with complacency, but Mussolini was not satisfied.

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The population quickly found its bearings amidst this mess. It began to realize that, should victory come, it would not be theirs, but Germany's. France had been too easy to beat, and had crumbled more through internal disintegration than through actual military defeat. Above all, it realized what it had always known but had tried to forget for a few days: that fascism was charlatanesque and, at times, revolting nonsense. But Italy was at war; to voice such an opinion was treason not only in the eyes of the police but also according to all traditional measures of judgment. So people, most people, kept their sickening sense of humiliation, anger, and sorrow to themselves, and carried on cheerfully with their jobs. Meanwhile, they were still willing to give their government the benefit of the doubt.

BOMBING OF BRITAIN

During the summer, fats were rationed and meat became scarce. Hitler not only failed to launch his promised, conclusive invasion of England, but also indulged in the wholesale bombing of London and other towns. And Mussolini asked his bosom friend to let Italian planes "share the honor" of bombing London. Everybody listened to the B.B.C. in spite of the prohibition against it and the jamming of the Italian transmissions. Everybody knew that the R.A.F. was performing miracles, that the people of England could and would "take it" without flinching, that their time-old trust in England was not misplaced. And most people already knew that they secretly hoped for British victory. For the average Italian at that time, a moral judgment about his position in respect to his country was a difficult and subtle question, but a humanitarian judgment about Hitler's bombing of England was extremely easy and obvious to formulate. And one of the distinguishing characteristics of the average Italian is a good heart. Mussolini again made one of his gross mistakes when he asked to "share the honor" of bombing London; again he showed a total incapacity to estimate the reactions of his own people. Meanwhile, he tried to bolster up their morale by drumming into them endless repetitions of "certain victory which could not fail to come soon." Some people laughed at him, others believed him, others hoped he was right; still others didn't care so long as anything came soon which would put an end to the war.

In the first days of September, Hitler made a speech commemorating the anniversary of the beginning of the war. It came as rather a shock to realize that the war had already been going on for a year, and nothing decisive had yet happened. France had been beaten, it was true; and in spite of the Italians' contempt for purely militaristic virtues, their contempt for France's lack of real resistance, and acquiescence to the Germans in the form of the Vichy government was still greater. "They did not have fascism, they have no excuse for such nonsense," was the current opinion. But the war was not over; Germany was evidently incapable of invading England, and from whence would "certain victory" come?

Later on in September, Graziani launched an offensive on the Egyptian frontier which caused a hullabaloo in the papers; it appeared that he was going to settle the issue of the war and regild Italy's tarnished prestige. Two weeks later it had petered out into "intense bombing" and "normal activity," and the headlines in the papers gradually flagged back to normal size. In the first days of October, just as it began to be evident that Graziani would not arrive in Cairo immediately, Hitler and Mussolini again met at the Brenner Pass to settle the final terms of the French armistice. Mussolini, it appears, only obtained some very minor satisfactions (not Corsica, not Biserta), and upon making objections, was told that after all *he* had not done the job of beating France. The brave Duce slunk back home, resolved to conquer military glory at all costs, while the papers were singing hosannas to the two chiefs, their complete agreement, and their "granitic" will to win.

As yet, it had not dawned upon Mussolini, nor upon any of his officials, that the reason for the scanty success of his enterprises was the absolute lack of a desire or a reason to fight in the great majority of the population. It had not dawned upon him that the spurious atmosphere of self-complacency, self-intoxication, and forced enthusiasm which he had created around himself and his government

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did not and could not have the slightest resonance in the population; and that, if people were willing to allow him the benefit of the doubt for a time, they would very easily come to the end of their tether. He did not realize that all his frantic efforts to conquer military glory at all costs merely made matters worse, because his only salvation in the eyes of the disillusioned men he was sending to battle would have been, if war were necessary, to make it as unaggressive and bloodless as possible.

The answer was certainly not to launch such an absurd, useless, and criminal venture as an attack on Greece in October. The behind-the-scenes causes and planning of this campaign are typical of fascist achievements. It appears that Badoglio, then Chief of Staff, when questioned about its possibility, had strongly advised Mussolini *not* to undertake a campaign in Greece in winter, adding that, if it were necessary for political reasons, at least 20 divisions were needed. These were not available at the time. So Mussolini, still burning with humiliation after dear Adolf's taunt, turned to the undersecretary for war (a Sicilian politician, not a military man) who reassured him that the thing could easily be done with only a few divisions. Aside from this, Ciano, it seems, had promised a good political preparation in Greece: the Chamouriots were waiting for the Italian liberators; Metaxas had promised there would only be slight nominal resistance elsewhere. So off they went, with six or seven divisions, much flag-waving, great headlines, and hopes for easy success. After two weeks, very little ground had been covered, and they were back to "intense bombing" and "normal activity." Then the Greeks, counter-attacking, occupied Coritza, Argirocastro, Santi Quaranta. Badoglio went to the front, and advised a general retreat, leaving only a bridge-head at Valona on the coast. Mussolini refused, and Badoglio presented his resignation as Chief of Staff, which was not accepted. A few days later, *Regime Fascista* (a servile pro-German paper edited by Farinacci) published an article accusing G.H.Q. of incompetence, inefficiency, and sabotage. Badoglio again presented his resignation, which was accepted this time. A day or so later, a general communiqué to all fascists revealed that Badoglio was a traitor, that he was responsible for the Greek fiasco through ill-will and lack of preparation. It was rumored that he was at the head of an anti-fascist organization, that he was a free-mason, and no doubt also a Jew. Meanwhile, Mussolini's disgust and indignation for his own people, who were thwarting his plans for glory and conquest, became more bilious and virulent every week.

On top of this, the British counter-attacked in Libya, and Wavell began his steady advance which was to bring him to Bengasi and allow him to capture nearly 180,000 Italian prisoners, 180,000 men who had been sent by a government they disliked to fight a war they disapproved of, who placed unlimited trust in the ultimate wisdom, fairness, and power of England, and were secretly glad to surrender to the obvious solution of their dilemma. After the fall of Bengasi in February, 1941, Mussolini made a speech in which he highly praised the British Empire, which had been until a few months before, a mere nonentity, an agglomerate of heterogeneous, decadent elements bound together merely by egoism, graft, and rapacity. Now it had become "the most powerful Empire in the world, and it would always be a reason of pride for Italy to have fought against it." The Eighth Army, which had been constituted by "the mercenary roughnecks from the four quarters of the globe," became the "best trained and most modernly equipped army in the world." But these desultory efforts to bolster the morale of the population were fruitless.

During the winter 1940-41, the people of Italy began to realize they were really "at war." Great promises had been made to them of certain victory, easy success, and a swift conclusion of the whole affair. But they found themselves up against ever-increasing difficulties on all sides: industries working part time through lack of coal; transportation and shipping slowed down through lack of coal and bombing; prices slowly but relentlessly rising. The food situation gradually got worse: rations were introduced for fats, meat, starchy foods, and sugar. They were insufficient in quantity and almost always a month or so late in being distributed. Other foods, like potatoes and dried figs, mysteriously dis-

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appeared from the market for months on end.

For demagogic reasons, rationing was always postponed till the last frantic moment. When it was put into practice, it was superficially organized on the basis of false figures by incompetent people, and enforced by other people who were perfectly aware of its inadequateness. No wonder that the population, with their innate disrespect for the law, dislike for fascism, and disapproval of the war, made no effort to help rationing work, were not surprised that it did not work, and turned as usual to their own wits and initiative to compensate its failings. Hence the "black market." But it took some time to organize a really efficient black market, and for months, in the beginning of 1941, the food situation was extremely poor, perhaps the poorest of all the war period.

THE GERMANS

This, of course, did not help to bolster morale. "Certain victory" was all very well; but when would the goods be delivered? And in some circles people began wondering if it would be possible for Italy to make a separate peace. What would the Germans do? And meanwhile, the Germans were beginning their seepage into Italy, slowly, craftily, inexorably. With the excuse of reinforcements for the air force to bomb Malta and British shipping in the Mediterranean, and of mechanized troops to help the Italians in Libya, Germans began to be seen everywhere. The movements of the port of Naples were controlled by them; to telephone between Rome and Naples, their special permit was necessary; their consent was required before planning commercial exports to central Europe; shares in the Stock Exchange began rising inexplicably because the Germans were buying them surreptitiously. In fact, they were buying everything they could lay hands on, and eventually the Italian government was obliged to publish a decree that for any purchase over 20 *lire* (one dollar in pre-war change) an Italian identity card must be produced and its number registered by the seller. The people's hope for a separate peace was nipped in the bud. They began to realize they were mere puppets in the Germans' hands, that, in reality, the Germans had begun occupying Italy.

There was a sudden turnabout in the trend of events. Bengasi was reoccupied, and Wavell was pushed back to the Egyptian region. The man in the street showed no surprise: of course, now there were Germans in Libya. He would have been highly surprised if the Italians by themselves had performed this feat, for he knew that the Italians not only *did not want* to fight, but were also poorly equipped, poorly fed, and extremely badly organized. Then the Germans attacked Yugoslavia, bombed Belgrade to smithereens, invaded Greece, and linked up with the Italian troops on the Albanian front after having covered in a few days ten times more ground than the Italians had covered in five months. In Greece, the Germans (who were still behaving correctly in France and Belgium), let loose their ruthless brutality on the population. The Italians disliked and disapproved of this, and there were frequent clashes between S.S. and Italian troops. Officialdom gloated over the prestige of German arms: they were invincible, the master race; glory and grandeur were for them and their allies. But the men and women of Italy, even the most rabid sustainers of fascism, even the officials, definitely knew that even if victory should come, it was Germany's victory and not theirs. They knew that if a separate peace were possible, they would be surrendering to a gentlemanly and fairly lenient opponent; whereas if victory came, they would be under the heel of the German master, a master who was brutal and ruthless with his own population, let alone with that of other countries. A year earlier, part of the people had been willing to allow their government the benefit of the doubt: perhaps an easy victory could really be obtained, and some advantage for poor Italy. But in the spring of 1941 everybody knew, and began saying, that *nothing could be gained for Italy by winning this war.*

From this statement, the next obvious step was to say: "Let's hurry up and get beaten;" and the people took it. At least, all those people who, either through unalloyed simplicity or through sound intelligence, were able to value the situation clearly. And they were legion. But this did not take the shape, not even the mental shape, of willful sabotage or treason; such things were still heretical and

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unheard of, not only through the 18 year-old habit of fearing the political police, but also through the century-old idea of loyalty to one's country. But military defeat, even when more or less voluntary, is not a pleasant process to undergo; willfully to make oneself the object of the scorn and contempt of one's opponent, of one's allies, of the whole world, is a gesture which cannot but create a deep cleavage within each man. In a country more subject to psychological complications it might have had lasting, deleterious effects upon the population. But Italy, for her greater fortune, is not the land of psychological complications; and though humiliation, unrest, uncertainty, and pain were in the heart of nearly all Italians, they still remained cheerful, serene, and practical, ready to forget—with the promptitude of infancy or of wisdom—as soon as circumstances would allow them to.

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

The depth of the Italians' conviction that the war could not last much longer—or at least, that Italy must soon get out of it—was revealed by the general consternation in May, when Hitler spoke of operations in 1942. (The Italian radio promptly explained that "certain victory" should, of course, have already come, but that owing to America's "hypocritical" intervention in the form of Lend-lease, things would be lengthened a bit. Without, of course, changing the final issue.) A still further jolt came in the early summer with the declaration of war against Russia. Hitler's fabulous victories in Russia strengthened the myth of German invincibility; but they did not rouse any enthusiasm in the population. On the contrary, they merely let each Italian feel more intensely than ever that he was a puppet in the Germans' hands, that it had been idiotic to engage upon such a venture as this war, and that it was highly desirable to get out of it as soon as possible. Surely Italy could not pull through *another* winter of war!

During the summer, impatience mounted. Propaganda bellowed that the Russian army was in decay, that America was in the throes of social strife and political strikes, that Roosevelt was the hysterical tyrant and oppressor of a cowed and disgusted population, that Britain was on her last legs and couldn't last many more months; and, as *ultima ratio,* that time was working *for* the Axis—when the whole thing had begun with the idea of the blitzkrieg, swift as lightning and equally withering. But people saw that the Russians did not surrender, that America was planning and producing quantities of arms that took the breath away, that Britain was beginning to bomb the German cities earnestly (aside from the sporadic and so far fairly harmless—but still most unpleasant—bombing of Italian cities). And their answer to the saying that time was working for the Axis was this witticism: "Do you know, Hitler has published a new book . . . . yes, it is called 'The First Twenty Years of My Lightning War.'" And inside Italy, they saw ever-increasing restrictions of all sorts: not only scarcity of food with black market prices too high for the masses (and a nominal, erratic, and purely demagogic prosecution of hoarders); but no coal for industries—factories closing down and workmen packed off as "volunteers" to Germany; the gas pressure so low in towns that only one burner could be used at a time; the sure signs of inflation everywhere with a government frantic and incompetent to prevent it.

As winter came near, the picture grew ever more dismal. Other foods were rationed (bread, potatoes, beans, cheese, sausages, eggs), and all of them were in insufficient quantities with irregular distribution. There was to be no heat till December, and then on a reduced scale (the whole of northern Italy —except the Riviera—is as cold as New York in winter); the sale of pastry and cake was forbidden; all cafés, restaurants, theatres should close down at 10:00 P.M., establishing practically a curfew (and many people said it was done for this purpose, and not to save electricity).

At about this period were created the famous "M" battalions," over which the papers gushed so enthusiastically. It must be remembered that there were two distinct military bodies in Italy: the army, and the fascist militia. These two bodies were irreconcilibly antagonistic; for the army possessed something of a tradition which made it contemptuous and diffident of the new-fangled, purely political upstart. Moreover, the army was by tradition devoted to the king—and at that moment

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loyalty to the king was the only overt form of anti-fascism that could be expressed with impunity. The militia, composed of volunteers, should have been a choice body of faithful, and among its officers there probably were a few really convinced and enthusiastic fascists. But its great appeal resided in the position of political vantage and predominance over the mass which it yielded to its components: a very powerful appeal for n'er-do-wells and opportunists. So in reality it was an inverse selection which it operated. Out of this "choice" body, in the fall of 1941, Mussolini created the "choicest" of battalions, which, as was blathered all over the country, were to go to the front and fight in the most dangerous (and spectacular) places. They were endowed with black neckerchiefs on which a large M in facsimile of Mussolini's handwriting was printed in white; the reminder of Cambronne was irresistible, and the population did not fail to notice it immediately. But however much they could laugh at the M battalions, the fact remained that these youths with unscrupulous faces and swaggering manners scarcely ever materialized at the front, whereas they did materialize very much in large cities. Their significance became obvious to the population. And with it, the realization that the farce of fascism was unmistakably turning into a tragedy.

There was an amusing and very significant episode which took place in Milan in October. Mussolini was expected to come for the official opening of the new building of *Il Popolo d'Italia* (the official fascist party paper, founded by him). As had been done in other similar occasions, the issue of the paper describing his arrival, his speech, his visit to the building, the delirious enthusiasm of the crowd gaping with love and admiration for the Duce, was prepared and printed before his arrival. The paper also described a visit to an automobile factory, with more drivelling enthusiasm on the part of the workmen. At the last minute, when Mussolini was at Parma for other similar manifestations, he was strongly advised by the police headquarters not to make any public appearance in Milan because opinion was too strong against him. So his visit did not take place. But unfortunately, quite a number of the premature copies of *Il Popolo d'Italia* had been distributed; measures were immediately taken to capture them, but a few had already been sold. The ridicule of the situation, the knowledge of which spread like wildfire, caused immense delight; and a copy of that issue of *Il Popolo d'Italia* was a highly prized trophy.

As the end of 1941 drew near, there were new elements to contribute to the general blues. The first was the changing of attitude of the Germans in France: hostages arrested and shot, terrorism. We have all become so inured nowadays to the tales of German, Japanese, and Russian atrocities that it is difficult to remember our first thrill of horror. For the Italians, the general thrill of horror caused all over the world by German terrorism in France assumed a particularly uncomfortable and sinister tinge. It was a foretaste of what the Germans would do in Italy, should the Italians follow their inclination and openly become an occupied country instead of being—at least officially—an ally.

PEARL HARBOR

Then came Pearl Harbor, and the Axis declaration of war against the United States. The subject of American intervention in the war had given rise to much verbiage in the papers during the past year: America would not come in, she was isolationist, she was not interested, she was at sixes and sevens with England, she was unprepared and unwilling. In reality, officialdom feared American intervention not only for her immense resources in wealth and manpower, but also and perhaps even more for the psychological consequences for the average Italian. If the Italian conceived of England as the tolerant grandfather of European politics, and placed trust, esteem, and admiration in her institutions and traditions, still he did not have the feeling of any emotional tie with England. And the typical, ineradicable feeling of superiority which the British willfully or unwillfully manifest towards all "dagos" could just possibly fan the Italian inferiority complex into dislike or even, in a moment of climax, into hatred. But America was quite another thing. America was "Uncle Sam," the melting pot, jocular, cordial, and hail-fellow-well-met. Millions of Italians had gone to America and become

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prosperous and happy (it takes so little to make the average Italian prosperous and happy!). They had not been thwarted by any racial or class prejudice. America was a wonderful land, the *Eldorado* where one did not find gold but a job, adequate pay, cleanliness, decency, and generosity. To hate America (propaganda insisted that one must hate the enemy) was not only absurd and sacrilegious, it was nearly fratricidal. It was, for the greater majority of Italians, utterly impossible. To declare war on America was the last drop in the bitter cup of idiocy which the fascist government was forcing down the throat of the population.

The fact that Pearl Harbor was a disaster, that the Japanese were enterprising and held the initiative for many months, occupying one island after the other—though it bolstered official morale for months and allowed them to make the rosiest forecasts of the issue of the war—did not make the slightest impression on the bulk of the population. It merely showed that the Japanese and the Germans were of the same metal: unlovely, aggressive, highly organized barbarians. And, for all those who were placing their hopes in a speedy defeat of the Axis, it was a discouraging element.

Meanwhile, two things were happening which threw a new light on the prospects for the near future: the Germans were actually retreating on the Russian front, and the English had begun mass bombing of German cities. Two headaches for propaganda, which had given up the Russian army as completely disintegrated four months earlier ("only a few mopping up operations"), and the moral and material resources of England as completely exhausted—a statement which had been made at least three times a month (except at the moment of Wavell's occupation of Bengasi) since the beginning of the war. The reverberations of these two developments on the morale of the Italian people were very important: on the one hand, a wave of enthusiasm, of deep-felt gratitude and admiration for Russia—the first nation to begin really beating the Germans; on the other, the possibility and prospect of the same treatment as Cologne and Essen were receiving being meted out to Italian cities. And the first signs that the myth of German invincibility might crumble.

As Christmas of 1941 came round, the discontent, tension, humiliation, anxiety, and dismay of the Italian people were already at flood level. Not only were their prospects for the future uncertain, but equally uncertain were their very hopes and desires. The war, which had begun on a sunny afternoon of June with flag-waving and singing, had become a world conflagration in which they found themselves relentlessly involved, to the tune of powerful, mastodontic task-masters who cared little for their lives, deaths, or problems.

A woman called up for jury duty refused to serve because she didn't believe in capital punishment.

Trying to persuade her, the judge explained: "This is merely a case where a wife is suing her husband because she gave him a thousand dollars to make a down payment on a fur coat and he lost the money in a poker game."

"I'll serve," she said, "I could be wrong about capital punishment."

—*Rib Ticklers*

Disgusted with the present system of education, a school-teacher in California submitted her resignation with this comment:

"In the public schools today, the teachers are afraid of the principals, the principals are afraid of the superintendent, he is afraid of the school board, the board members are afraid of the parents, the parents are afraid of the children, and the children are afraid of nobody!"

—*Peter Roesar*

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We won with assists from Japan

THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF

By LEE L. LEVERT

Commander, U.S.N.R.; Planning Officer for the Leyte Gulf area;
Author of *Fundamentals of Naval Warfare.*

Mr. Levert speaks as a private citizen; his views do not reflect the attitude of the Navy Department.

THIS country is in desperate need of military leaders who are capable of unselfish service, and dispassionate, balanced judgment. We must have leaders who believe in teamwork and are willing to forego personal glory. We cannot tolerate the "sovereign and independent" services or commands. Our military leaders must understand and stress mutual interdependence. They must realize that a chain is no stronger than its weakest link.

In the Battle of Leyte Gulf we received numerous "assists" from the Japanese commanders because they, too, believed in the non-cooperation doctrine. This lack of unity and understanding among the Japanese commanders, coupled with their great inferiority in strength and poor tactical training, made the outcome of that battle almost a certainty. On at least one occasion the Japanese tactics were literally patterned after those used by Nelson at Trafalgar!

If the recent war was a veritable mine of inter- and intra-service disputes and friction, then the Battle for Leyte Gulf could be called the "mother lode" herself. A recitation of some of the errors committed in that memorable engagement would not be out of place on Ripley's "Believe it or not" radio program. At Leyte Gulf, the Japanese services failed to cooperate and their flag officers displayed the traditional timidity about crossing service, or command lines, even in cases of dire necessity. The Battle for Leyte Gulf makes good reading for our public because we can laugh at somebody else's expense. This was not true at Pearl Harbor.

Some of the errors were stupid, others downright ludicrous. Fortunately for us, Japanese errors outnumbered ours by a good margin. Thus victory was made inevitable for us by the combination of Japanese stupidities and our own overwhelming superiority in strength.

At the battle's end, hysterical voices acclaimed it as the greatest and most decisive victory of all time. Some commentators went so far as to compare our leadership in it with that of the immortal Nelson. Nothing can be further from the truth. Some of these "experts" based their statements on purely emotional grounds, or refusal to be handicapped by facts and figures.

Long before the Japanese version of the battle became available, it was known that we had won in spite of the faulty implementation of our plans. Subsequent data obtained from Japanese sources supported this conclusion. These documents revealed to what extent our former enemies were guilty of errors bordering on the lunatic, despite the fact that their over-all plan was sound.

Our initial landing took place near the town of Tacloban on Leyte Island, one of the large islands of the Philippine Archipelago. Leyte Gulf was soon packed with ships bringing the

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invasion force and its supplies. With the initial beachhead established, further progress inland was dependent upon the arrival of reinforcements and additional supplies.

There are two entrances to Leyte Gulf, both narrow. One is situated to the south of that body of water and is known as Surigao Strait. The other, to the east, is partially blocked by two small islands. Our invasion force used this entrance to the gulf.

There never was any doubt that the Japanese reaction was going to be decisive and energetic. The mission of the Japanese armed forces was to destroy our shipping in Leyte Gulf in order to repel the invasion. The destruction of our shipping would certainly have resulted in the annihilation or surrender of our invasion force of about 200,000 men. The Japanese struck by air first but failed of their purpose.

They then activated their Shō plan, which had been prepared for such a contingency. This plan relied heavily for success upon the element of surprise, and upon the very careful timing of movements of several naval task forces charged with its implementation. Because of their great inferiority in naval strength, the Japanese high command realized that their only chance of success lay in splitting this naval strength into several groups, on the supposition that one of these might succeed in breaking through a smaller American task force into the Gulf.

The Shō plan divided the Japanese naval forces into three groups. The Northern group, under Vice-Admiral Ozawa, was intended to be the bait designed to divert the American main strength from the other two groups. The Central group, with Vice-Admiral Kurita in command, was supposed to force the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf. The Southern group, under Vice-Admirals Shima and Nishimura, was expected to enter the Gulf through Surigao Strait. Admiral Toyoda was in over-all command of the Japanese naval forces.

A section of the Central group, under Vice-Admiral Nishimura, was detached and ordered to accompany the Southern group. Nishimura, however, was not placed under tactical command of Shima. Thus the Southern force consisted of two separate and distinct commands. No doubt this peculiar arrangement increased the confusion and provides a partial explanation for some incredible moves made by that ill-fated Japanese task group.

The mission of the American naval forces was to prevent the Japanese from striking at our shipping in the Gulf and thus protect the landing operations. Everything else was secondary to this task. In his report published early in 1945, Fleet Admiral King stated: "The 3rd Fleet . . . . was to cover and support the operation by air strikes over Formosa, Luzon, and Visayas, to provide protection for the landing against heavy units of the Japanese fleet. . . . ."

We were stronger by far than the Japanese. The number of warships of various classifications before the operations began was approximately as follows:

	American	Japanese
Battleships	12	9
Aircraft carriers	8	1
Light aircraft carriers	8	3
Heavy cruisers	9	13
Light cruisers	14	6
Destroyers	84	33

These figures reveal only a part of the story, since only two of the Japanese battleships were modern, and ship for ship our warships were better and newer than the Japanese. The tabulation also does not include 16 escort aircraft carriers, destroyers, and destroyer escorts belonging to Admiral Sprague's command. Nor does it make any allowance for one battleship (the giant *Musashi,* one of the two modern Japanese battleships), four heavy cruisers, and four destroyers which were not available to the Japanese when the naval battle started. These Japanese losses were due to our preliminary air and submarine strikes. We lost only the *Princeton* by sinking, and the *Birmingham* was badly damaged while trying to save the light aircraft carrier.

An examination of the map of the Philippines will reveal that in order to reach the eastern entrance of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese, sighted by our submarines off Palawan Island, would either have to sail clear around Mindanao Island, join their Southern group, and then force Surigao Strait, or risk the navigational hazards of San Bernardino Strait.

Either course involved great risks and was

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likely to result in the destruction of the entire Japanese naval strength. These ships, however, were not as valuable to Japan as might appear from first glance. The Japanese Navy was finished, long before the Battle for Leyte Gulf was fought, when the Japanese cargo ships were sunk. North of the Philippines their warships could obtain ammunition and the necessary spare parts but very little oil. South of the archipelago, there was oil but no ammunition. The Japanese high command understood the situation when it decided to activate the Shō plan. The entire Shō operation was supposed to be a sacrifice hit intended to delay our advance toward the homeland of Japan and to inflict heavy casualties upon our ground forces.

The Shō plan was well conceived and called for very accurate timing. Like all plans involving coordinated operations of several widely separated task forces, it required a high degree of cooperation and exercise of superior judgment on the part of individual task force commanders. Fortunately for us, neither Nishimura nor Shima paid any attention to the plan, and Kurita failed to come through at the most critical moment. Only Ozawa, with Admiral Halsey's unintentional assist, succeeded in carrying out his task, i.e., diverting the bulk of the American naval strength to the point where it would do the least good.

The Northern group comprised two combination battleship-aircraft carriers, one aircraft carrier, three light aircraft carriers, three light cruisers, and ten destroyers. Actually this group was much weaker than it appeared to be on paper. Ozawa's aircraft carriers were mere empty shells, literally as well as metaphorically. Gone were the skillful pilots who fought at Pearl Harbor and Midway. Newly trained naval air strength had been decimated at the Formosa battle which preceded the invasion, and only a few pilots were left to man the carrier aircraft.

This deliberate sacrifice of the remaining Japanese aricraft carriers was a measure born of desperation. Ozawa never had any illusions about his chances of survival. In order to lure our forces, Ozawa deliberately broke radio silence. He also used his aircraft, manned by half-trained pilots, for scouting and nibbling at various components of the 3rd Fleet. He could not do much more because his entire air complement comprised 110 aircraft, of which about 80 were fighters. The normal complement of one of our aircraft carriers was about 85 planes. Ozawa thus had 110 aircraft pitted against at least 700 of our planes, manned by superbly trained and experienced pilots.

As soon as Admiral Halsey's search planes located the "bait," he started the pursuit. During this pursuit he received several messages of distress from Vice Admiral Kinkaid, one of which read: "Request immediate air strike. Also request support by heavy ships. My old battleships low in ammunition." There were several other messages of distress sent in plain language. The mere fact that these messages were addressed to Halsey could not preclude their interception by the Japanese. If the Japanese did intercept these messages, they failed to act accordingly.

BULL'S RUN

There is no doubt that Admiral Halsey swallowed the Japanese bait hook, line, and sinker. There can be no other explanation for his headlong dash north, known as "Bull's Run," with all the new battleships and aircraft carriers belonging to his command.

Two or three new battleships would have been sufficient to cover our own aircraft carriers. Such a task force could easily have overcome any array which the enemy could have gathered north of San Bernardino Strait. This means that at least three, and possibly four, new battleships could have been spared for the defense of Leyte Gulf. These statements are not based on hindsight, because Admiral Halsey should have known that the Japanese naval strength north of San Bernardino Strait could not possibly exceed that of the unaccounted portion of the Japanese Navy. Since the composition of the other two Japanese forces was known, the unaccounted-for task force could not have more than two battleships.

Halsey decided that the Central group was no longer a menace and that San Bernardino Strait was not navigable at night. He failed to change his plans even after receiving information from one of our carrier pilots that

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the Japanese were moving eastward through the Strait at high speed. It is true that the Japanese command organization was quite complicated but not complicated enough to fool the Japanese into obeying Halsey's decisions.

It is likely that "Bull's Run" would have been nipped in the bud if General MacArthur had any inkling about Halsey's intentions to leave the assigned post. After all, MacArthur not only was Halsey's ally but his superior as well. Admiral Kinkaid was also thrown off his scent when he based all his dispositions on the assumption that the entire might of the 3rd Fleet was ready to meet the Japanese sandman as soon as he emerged from San Bernardino Strait.

At the time the first contact was made with the Japanese Central group off Samar, Halsey's force was at least 12 hours away, and his ships were steaming at high speed away from the place where he should have been. The first message calling for help reached Admiral Halsey shortly after 8 A.M. He then ordered the force under Admiral McCain to come to Admiral Kinkaid's assistance. McCain's group consisted of three aircraft carriers, two light aircraft carriers, and four cruisers—hardly a force to handle four battleships, eight cruisers, and eleven destroyers of the Japanese Central group. Because of the distances involved, the aircraft flown off McCain's carriers could not reach Leyte Gulf in less than three hours.

Halsey himself continued north and did not turn back until after three hours had elapsed. This means that he squandered at least five precious hours, since some allowance must be made for retracing the distance made good (in the wrong direction) during the intervening period. When Halsey finally decided to return to Leyte Gulf, he committed another error of judgment by taking all his battleships with him. He left behind him two carrier groups without any battleship protection. The Japanese force opposing these carriers had two battleships.

It appears that Halsey missed the interception of the Japanese Central group by only two hours. If he had heeded Kinkaid's message immediately upon receiving it, and had turned south, he could have struck at the Japanese with all his heavy gunnery ships. Here again Halsey "missed the boat."

In this engagement between the 3rd Fleet and the Japanese Northern group, known as the Battle off Cape Engaño, the remainder of the Japanese carrier strength was destroyed but the battleships escaped. The last surviving Japanese "Pearl Harbor" aircraft carrier, the *Zuikaku,* was sunk. The word "Engaño" means lure, deception, or mistake in Spanish —an appropriate name for this battle in more ways than one!

According to the Shō plan, the Central and the Southern groups were to strike at the shipping in Leyte Gulf simultaneously. The former was routed to the eastern entrance of Leyte Gulf and the latter, in company with Nishimura's section, was expected to use Surigao Strait. Kinkaid decided to concentrate practically his entire gunnery strength at Surigao Strait in order to insure the destruction of the Southern group should it venture into the Strait. He left the eastern entrance practically uncovered. These dispositions would have been sound but for one fatal weakness—Halsey was not where Kinkaid thought he was.

SURIGAO STRAIT

Surigao Strait, which is 35 miles long and 10 miles wide at its narrowest point, stretches between the islands of Leyte and Dinagat. The narrow section of the Strait lay about 60 miles from our beachhead on Leyte. Early in October 25, 1944, the Southern group steamed into the trap which we had prepared for them.

The American forces in the Strait included six old battleships in addition to lighter units. Our battleships were placed across the Strait in such a manner that their broadsides commanded its narrowest point. To oppose our forces, the Japanese had two battleships, four cruisers, and eight destroyers. Our strength there was far superior to that of the Japanese; we occupied a commanding position, and we had the element of surprise on our side. We were short of ammunition, however, and could fight only for a limited period of time.

Admiral Nishimura, the commander of the section attached to the Southern group, apparently missed his calling. It was he who committed a series of errors which will remain unsurpassed for their sheer lunacy. It is fortunate for him that he went down with his

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flagship. It was also apparent that his entire command was imbued with a spirit of buffoonery never surpassed or even equalled in the annals of naval history. Neither does Admiral Shima loom as a mental giant, even when referred to the low standard set by Nishimura.

Instead of following the schedule, which was coordinated with that of the Central group, Nishimura suddenly decided to advance his sailing. This was contrary to the orders issued by Admiral Toyoda. Apparently Nishimura wanted to "git there fustest" but he forgot all about "with the mostest."

Nishimura assumed that the rest of the Southern group, under Shima, was 40 miles behind him when he entered Surigao Strait. Similarly, Shima took it for granted that Nishimura's detachment was in the van. Neither admiral made any effort to communicate with each other. Truly a case of the "Nishimuras speaking only to the Kuritas and the Kuritas speaking only to Toyodas." Shima was six months senior to Nishimura—a very serious matter as far as naval hierarchy is concerned. Either Shima, naming the senior officer first, or Nishimura could have verified their relative locations. They knew their places on the seniority lists!

One of the most remarkable features of the Battle of Surigao Strait was the fact that the Japanese, upon discovering that they had sailed into a trap, obligingly proceeded to turn in succession instead of turning simultaneously, just as the Germans did under somewhat similar circumstances at Jutland. As far as we are concerned, this was not a battle but a "naval execution." The "ghost ships" of Pearl Harbor were the executioners, and the Japanese moved just like ducks in a shooting gallery!

Admiral Nishimura's number was up but the force under Shima was not yet committed and it was still some distance away from the point where Nishimura met his doom. Shima placed the heaviest ship of his formation in the lead. He insisted on leading with his chin because of the tradition in the Japanese Navy that the commander must be in the van of his force. No doubt, Shima used Nelson's formation at Trafalgar as the guide for his tactics.

On her way to her execution, Shima's flagship, the cruiser *Nachi,* met the destroyer *Shigure* limping back from the carnage. It was still pitch dark and the *Shigure* challenged; the flagship replied: "I am *Nachi.*" The return was almost as laconic, "I am *Shigure,* I have rudder difficulties." Who said that only the British are the masters of understatement! There was not a word about the trap or any other communications after this short exchange.

Commander Nishino, the captain of the *Shigure,* later stated ". . . . I sent information to Admirals Toyoda and Kurita . . . . the reason I did not communicate directly with Admiral Shima and inform him of the situation was that I had no connection with him and was not under his command."

Some military may understand Commander Nishino's reasoning, but it is too much for a civilian to follow. This is reminiscent of the statement made by General Short, of Pearl Harbor fame, "Neither of us," no doubt referring to Admiral Kimmel, "would have wanted the other to be prying into matters that didn't concern him."

It might appear that by now the components of the Southern group had committed all the possible errors in the book. Not at all! So intent was the personnel of the *Nachi* on firing her guns that they failed to notice the blazing cruiser, the *Mogami,* belonging to Nishimura's ill-fated section, and hit her at full speed. The *Nachi* sustained crippling damage to her hull.

In spite of all this tomfoolery, the Southern force succeeded, at least in part, in carrying out its mission. Our battle force exhausted its ammunition, which was low to start with, in dispatching the Japanese to Davy Jones' locker. Now we had none left to meet the menace which loomed at the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf. At that time, Kinkaid was not aware of the fact that our entire strength there consisted of "jeep" carriers, destroyers, and destroyer escorts.

It was known that the Central group was moving west, away from San Bernardino Strait, after receiving a bloody nose from Admiral Halsey's fliers, and rough handling by our submarines. We were not aware of the fact that this force was later ordered back by

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Admiral Toyoda and started to retrace its path to San Bernardino Strait. The Central group lost only one major unit, the giant *Musashi,* but it was still powerful enough to cope with the 7th Fleet.

When the Central group entered San Bernardino Strait, its strength was reduced by one battleship, four heavy cruisers, and four destroyers. Admiral Kurita had himself to blame for some of these losses because he too led with his chin when he failed to place the destroyers ahead of his heavy ships, as an anti-submarine screen. Our submarines did not hesitate to take advantage of this opportunity. They accounted for three heavy cruisers, two sunk and one severely damaged, and two destroyers which were assigned to cover the cripple. The *Musashi* was sunk by our aircraft after absorbing 16 bomb hits and taking 10 torpedoes.

KURITA

Kurita, after performing the extremely difficult feat of negotiating the navigational hazards of San Bernardino Strait at night, was now faced with the "tissue paper" screen of jeeps and their escorts. For all intents and purposes, the road to Leyte Gulf was open and Kurita held the fate of 200,000 Americans in his grasp. But he started to chase our jeep carriers. He mistook these escort carriers for the fleet type and by some legerdemain gave these ships speeds in excess of 30 knots. This was far better than the best engineers in the United States Navy were able to accomplish!

Kurita did not realize that he was dealing with three task groups of escort aircraft carriers under Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague. It was this force which faced the strongest Japanese task force in the battle off Samar.

The northern escort carrier group was the first to come under the Japanese fire. Upon receiving this information, Kinkaid sent his appeals for help to Halsey and started to organize a striking force of his own. This was a measure born of desperation because our battleships were low in ammunition and fuel. They were in no condition to fight the new menace which faced us at the east entrance to the gulf even if they could arrive in time.

Kurita had no knowledge of Halsey's whereabouts. In this respect he was no worse off than Kinkaid. Ozawa was unable to communicate this vital information to other Japanese task forces because of transmission apparatus failures. It is likely that the Japanese Army command knew something about our naval dispositions, through air reconnaissance, but decided to follow the usual non-cooperation policy. Even now, in the twilight of their military might and during the death throes of their empire, the Japanese armed forces operated under common directives but without unity of command.

It is here, in the Battle of Samar, where pygmies fought giants, and one of the most glorious pages of the American naval history was written. The spirit of the men who fought against really hopeless odds can be illustrated by the following two incidents.

While our force was retiring under Japanese pressure, the range was closing because our ships could not do much more than 18 knots (Kurita's opinion notwithstanding). Some wit said, "We are sucking them into our forty millimeter gun range."

At the time when the Japanese decided to break off the pursuit, a signalman, pointing at the receding pagoda masts, exclaimed, "The . . . . are getting away from us."

Even after Kurita decided to break off the pursuit of our escort aircraft carriers, he proceeded for more than two hours to mill around near the entrance to the gulf. He later stated that this was done in order to evaluate the situation! He let time which was even more precious than his ships slip by in face of an opportunity which was as unprecedented as well as apparent to anyone in a less befuddled state. The Japanese Navy suffered great losses in order to gain this opportunity only to see the ball carrier slip near the goal, after he had cleared all defenses.

After this aimless milling around, Kurita decided to sail north in order to help the decoy force! This truly ludicrous decision was just as logical as jumping overboard to save the bait while it is being nibbled by the fish it was expected to attract. After all, Ozawa's mission was to lure a superior American force in order to cut down the odds against the other two task groups.

Ozawa succeeded because his tactics were sound, and Halsey fell into the trap laid for

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him. Even Nishimura and Shima, in spite of their idiotic tactics, cleared the path for Kurita by absorbing our ammunition supply. Thus Kurita's indecision nullified the efforts of the other two task forces.

There is little doubt that constant harassment by aircraft and suicidal torpedo strikes by Sprague's destroyers and destroyer escorts had a lot to do with Kurita's decision to call it a day. As far as our side is concerned, the chief credit must go to the escort carrier groups of the 7th Fleet under Admiral Thomas L. Sprague. Great courage and resourcefulness displayed by all hands, in face of overwhelming odds, did as much as the entire vaunted might of the 3rd Fleet, which was not there.

Admiral Halsey, in his efforts to intercept the Japanese now retiring from Leyte Gulf, left his slower battleships behind and was steaming ahead with only the *Iowa* and *New Jersey*, plus three light cruisers. Here again, we were willing to match an inferior strength against a superior Japanese force. The *Yamato* was armed with 18-inch guns, as against the 16-inch rifles of our battleships, and was bigger than either of our two battleships. It is possible that our superior fire control might have evened the scales or even tipped them in our favor, but this is beside the point. This unnecessary risk was due entirely to our faulty dispositions in the first place. In spite of our overwhelming superiority in naval strength, we were weak at the most critical point.

This meeting of two battlelines never came to pass because Kurita again changed his mind and ducked to safety through San Bernardino Strait. His excuse this time was far more logical than the one he gave for his failure to enter Leyte Gulf. His fuel supply was now running low, and he feared daylight strikes by our carrier aircraft.

Thus ended the Battle for Leyte Gulf, a battle we should have won without difficulty and without incurring great risks. It was fortunate indeed that the Japanese admirals had displayed a mixture of rashness and timidity which nullified all the advantages gained through our miscues. No risks can be justified solely on the basis that operations were crowned with success. We must bear in mind the fact that a loser's errors always stand out in bold relief while a winner's are too often glossed over.

Halsey's failure to keep MacArthur posted about all his moves put us in a desperate plight. The Japanese failed to cash in on this opportunity largely because of the traditional non-cooperation policy of their services. Their insistence upon staying in their own command "groove," euphoniously known as the "chain of command," was another contributing factor. Commander Nishino, rather than cross the command line, let Shima sail into the trap.

The Battle for Leyte Gulf, as well as the Pearl Harbor debacle, should be a lesson to all of us. We cannot afford to gamble on a favorable interplay of personalities among our service leaders to insure inter-service cooperation. Under the present law, the service leaders, like John L. Lewis's miners, will cooperate only when they are willing. Inter-service cooperation must be automatic, and common responsibility apparent to all without the necessity for calling an umpire.

We cannot afford another gamble with our national safety and the lives of our citizens. In the next test, somebody far more competent than Kurita may be at the helm.

Good business:

Burnham and Overbake run a bakery in Newark, New Jersey, and O'Neill and Pray manufacture church benches in Chicago.

Chuter Ede said recently in the British House of Commons:

"I made up my mind, as a magistrate of a Juvenile Court, that when I reached the age of 60 I would retire. I notified my colleagues immediately after my sixtieth birthday, and my resignation was received with great indignation. I found I was the third youngest member of the Court!" —*Daily Herald*

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A native returns

GERMANY REVISITED

By FREDERICK H. CRAMER
Professor of History, Mount Holyoke College

I

ON a rainy April day in 1933, the Berlin-Vienna Express took me out of Germany. Two days before I had witnessed the "national boycott" day imposed by Hitler upon the German Jews. No violence to speak of had taken place in Berlin, but myriads of posters warned the German people not to buy in Jewish stores and not to associate with Jews in any way whatever. Blood-curdling threats against the transgressor of the ban were impressively reinforced by sturdy, grim-faced storm-troopers posted in front of the more important Jewish-owned establishments. The outside world was astounded but it remained fundamentally uncomprehending. There were protests, of course, and a first shudder of premonition. But even inside Germany most people, including the Jews, seemed to think that this was merely another Nazi propaganda piece, and that Hitler, now safely embedded amidst German conservatives in a cabinet position of supreme responsibility, would calm down. Things would become normal again. Moreover, the military equality promised Germany at the ill-starred Disarmament Conference of 1932 would, it was confidently rumored, provide a rearmament boom which would mitigate or even eliminate the bane of German unemployment, numbered in millions of people for the past few years.

Some Germans, however, knew better, especially the Communists. After Goering had set the torch to the Reichstag building, they had been charged at once with this piece of political arson. The Communist Party, third largest of all parties in the pre-March Reichstag, was outlawed; its leaders fled to the Soviet haven. Those who did not filled the nascent concentration camps, where they were soon joined by a motley crowd of others who had run afoul of the Nazis.

Communists, German Jews, liberals, or plain believers in democracy felt the fiery breath of the German revolution. Our train was crowded with German travelers outward bound. The route in those days was a preferred one, for it was the shortest from Berlin to a "friendly" frontier; it reached the then still warmly democratic Czechoslovakia after a mere 160 miles from the German capital. The exodus of wary Germans had been going on for a few days when I boarded the train. Anxious parents with restive children, young people, old people —the crowded cars seemed like sections of a modern ark filled with people seeking shelter from a deadly flood. Not all of them, however, were destined to reach safety. At the border, the usual German custom guards were reinforced by tough-looking storm-troopers who went from compartment to compartment questioning all travelers. Prague had already become suspect as an anti-Nazi center, and any German whose ticket was issued for Prague or another Czech station was summarily taken off the train for further investigation. Ironically enough, Vienna was then still considered by the Nazis as a "friendly" capital, and those who had booked through tickets to Vienna were left unmolested. Even so, the train became quite empty. On that day I vowed not to visit Germany again while it bowed to Hitler. I have kept that vow.

II

Fifteen years later the time had come to revisit Germany. For three years Allied armies of occupation ruled what had once been the

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German Empire. Four zones with feeble German local administrations had taken the place of Hitler's supercentralized, monolithic state. V-E Day had come and gone, and there was no peace in sight for Germany. Money was abundant, goods scarce, black markets flourished, the people were sullen and restive. When the opportunity seemed to present itself, I decided to gain first-hand experience with Germany's post-war problems.

Just before I departed, a new currency had been introduced in the three Western zones. It was to reduce the swollen monetary system to healthier dimensions by the radical device of abolishing 90 per cent of all existing money and to issue only 5 per cent of the remaining 10 per cent within a reasonably close future. The remaining 5 per cent were to be deblocked later. (By now most of the latter 5 per cent has also been declared forfeit.) Yet, in spite of the glowing adulation with which Army economists congratulated themselves on their successful coup against the inflationary old mark, the new mark circulated at a considerable discount in Switzerland, the last European country where money honestly acquired is yours to do with as you please. A German 10-mark bill (new currency) was officially (i.e., by the United States Administration) valued at $3.30. In Switzerland, however, you could buy it for 75 cents. Moreover, wild differences in value existed between different denominations of the new German currency. For instance, a 50-mark bill could be bought for $2.50, while 50 marks in 10-mark bills would cost $3.75, i.e., 50 per cent more. Small wonder, therefore, that enterprising travelers made fortunes. It worked this way, as the Swiss bank clerks told us ruefully: If someone came out of Germany, carrying with him (strictly illegally, of course) 50,000 marks in 50-mark bills, and left the profit in Swiss francs in Switzerland, he could return home in one day's time with his working capital intact, but with a Swiss nest-egg of $1250. The only risk he might run was the control at the German border.

That this was no idle story I observed for myself on one occasion. Wishing to buy 50 marks at the Zürich railroad station's bank bureau for a friend who was returning to Germany, I was told that only 50-mark bills were available at the moment. These were useless for my purpose: tips, porters' fees, and the like. When I was about to turn away, the young man who waited in line behind me spoke up: "Wait a minute! I have just arrived from Germany. I am about to change 200 marks in small bills into Swiss money. That will enable the cashier to help you out." And thus it was done. I had to pay 50 per cent more for the five 10-mark bills than the bank had wanted to charge me for the one bill of 50-marks. To climax the affair, my unhappy friend, believing himself entitled to this small sum as a traveler's necessity, was promptly relieved of 35 marks at the border, when he honestly told the inquiring officials how much he was bringing in—a total of $15 at the higher official reckoning.

III

The first Germans we met after crossing the German border in the pouring rain at the densely-wooded Thayingen post were old-time custom guards, loosely supervised by a few French Army men who looked almost as lean and hungry as the Germans themselves. Upon hearing that we had left Paris the day before, they asked us countless questions about *la belle France* and none about any dutiable goods or money carried. The Germans entered our passport data perfunctorily into their books, and that was all. When we were about to pull away from the curb, one of the German officials asked us for a lift to Singen. We agreed, and I helped him stow away his three bags. They were exceedingly heavy. He never said what they contained. It must have been books, metal of some kind, or meat. I still believe it was Swiss meat on its way to the black market in Germany. But then, it may have been harmless books after all!

Without losing a moment, our guest revealed that he had never been a Nazi. Of course, he had fought three years in Russia, but then—the Russians. When were we going to go to war against them? Why had we not done it right away in 1945 and finished the job? (A question one hears almost everywhere in Western Europe.) He was a top-notch photographer. Could we help him emigrate? He did not care where, as long as he was getting out of Germany. We had to

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tell him, unfortunately, that judging from our own experience of getting into Germany it would probably be even more difficult for him to get out of the country. We dropped him without much sorrow at Singen and drove on towards Stuttgart. We passed Tübingen, whose university is famed for its philosophical studies, the social sciences, and its Protestant school of theology. It had suffered badly from the war. Lean looking men and somewhat better-fed women and children filled the streets. Some rebuilding has been going on, but the whole town still has the disturbed and nervous atmosphere of a city in the uneasy mood between war and peace (or should one say between World War II and World War III?). It may be news to some people that at this time Otto Hahn, co-author of the fundamental experiments leading to the discovery of the freeing of atomic energy in the splitting of the uranium atom, is now working in Tübingen, surrounded by some of the scientists from the former *Kaiser Wilhelm Institut* in Berlin-Dahlem. The French, with their own Joliot and the German Hahn, have at least two real trumps in the realm of atomic research, even though their material resources may be too slender to grant such researchers adequate facilities.

The French zone of occupation, with the exception of the Saar area, is primarily agricultural. It lacks large cities and geographical cohesion, being bisected near Karlsruhe into a northwestern and southeastern area. When Nazi Germany collapsed, the French occupied Stuttgart, capital of Württemberg, and hoped to keep it in their zone. They also reserved for themselves the important railroad junction of Karlsruhe, insuring direct railroad communication from their temporary capital at Frankfurt to Munich. But the Americans ousted them, and the disappointed French then chose Baden-Baden, a spa of international reputation, as their German capital. The town lies beautifully embedded in the Oos valley amidst the densely wooded hills of the Black Forest. Its numerous hotels survived the war almost intact and furnished suitable quarters for the administrative offices and personnel.

The grave economic condition of post-war France has prevented her from carrying out any ambitious program in her German zone. She did, however, like Poland, anticipate a final peace settlement by incorporating the Saar area in the French economic realm. This was done by a plebiscite in which the starved Saarlanders overwhelmingly reversed themselves, having voted by more than 90 per cent to rejoin Germany ten years previously. From what I saw, they were undoubtedly better off than the population in other industrial areas of the French zone of occupied Germany, the French franc being all in all still preferable as a currency to whatever German mark the economic wizards of the Nazi and post-Nazi era have established in Trizonia.

In contrast to Britain and the United States, the French, desperately dollar-short even for their own needs at home, have followed a policy of letting their zone feed itself; they even sent French children on government-sponsored vacations into their zone. The predominantly agricultural character of the area enabled the population to survive. Of all rural areas we saw, however, the French showed the most starved-looking peasantry, due in part to the poor harvest of 1947.

On the French reparations policy, views differed radically. No German anywhere was willing to admit that the dismantling of German plants and the shipment of machinery to the victims of German aggression was a justifiable retribution. The French, next to the Russians, undoubtedly insisted most energetically on the carrying out of the industrial reparations program. They also were most reluctant to further any policy leading towards political unification of what remained of Germany. While we were there, they had just grudgingly agreed to the economic fusion of their zone with the Anglo-American Bizonia, when the new German currency was introduced. They had also grimly voted the acceptance of the London program calling for a re-establishment of a provisional German government for Trizonia.

In one sphere, however, the French have far outdistanced all other occupying powers—the cultural realm. Their encouragement of German writers, theatres, and artists compares favorably with the laissez-faire policy of the American and British authorities who, outside the regular academic realm, have done

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comparatively little along these lines. Even in the field of secondary education the French and the British have been far more intelligent than our policy-makers. One instance may illustrate this. Instead of falling back upon Nazi textbooks in the all-important subject of history, the British and French have introduced entirely new textbooks written by recognized scholars abroad, most of whom are of German extraction. The Americans, on the other hand, after a number of fumbling tries, decided to reprint textbooks dating from the (oh so good and democratic!) period of the Weimar Republic. What they obviously forgot was the fact that most of Hitler's enthusiastic teen-age followers had been brought up on those very textbooks. In one instance a Weimar period history reader slated for publication in large quantity had to be withdrawn and destroyed on the eve of its re-issue, because it referred to our Allies, France and England, in ferociously deprecatory terms.

IV

Impressions sketched themselves with unforgettable vividness. There was the road that was not there, although the latest post-war map showed it. Signs on the parkway-like *Reichsautobahn* were few and far between; large warnings indicated the nearest emergency repair place, often many worrisome miles distant. Gasoline, prepaid in about hundred gallon lots at the PX in scrip dollars, was sold only to travelers "with facilities" and had to be taken from a small number of stations specified on a mimeographed sheet.

There were plenty of American troops on the march everywhere. We were stopped for about half an hour in front of the shattered remnants of Munich's main railroad station, while smartly uniformed M.P. traffic directors took the place of the German police and directed an almost unending caravan of mud-spattered tanks, trucks, jeeps, and auxiliary vehicles, filled with soldiers and equipment, across the main thoroughfares of Munich.

There were other incidents reminding us that this was a world in which Alice in Wonderland, Gilbert and Sullivan, and Jonathan Swift seemed happily united in an attempt to show what could really be done if men tried to create a surrealist reality. There were the hungry faces of Germans peering shyly at the cautiously uninviting PX entrances, behind which they knew the happy victors could buy things long vanished from official circulation in Germany. Even though the monetary reform had driven goods back into regular trade channels at the time, prices had been raised beyond the average German's pocketbook.

I remember the fine Saturday morning, when the Swiss Consulate wanted payment of 12 marks, and the American Express coyly informed us that they could not give us any marks on our travelers checks. Helpfully the Army Finance Office, which does issue marks against such checks, was tightly closed on Saturday. I am intentionally vague, because I do not want to make trouble for three starved-looking German postal employees who came to the rescue. These three girls staffed one of the yellow-tableted special little post offices, where foreign gods could telegraph and telephone with the outside world, a privilege still beyond the reach of the Germans three years after the end of the shooting war. The three begged us for some food in lieu of any tip for their kindness. So we went into the forbidden paradise, the local PX, bought some powdered coffee and cheese and tipped them this way. If this be treason against Army regulations—let Patrick Henry finish the remainder of the quotation.

The Germans themselves were as contradictory as ever. There were the gentle old professors, lost in melancholy reveries and still loath to admit the guilt of Germany's educated elite in abetting the Nazi regime. There were the students, an even more starved-looking lot than the run-of-the-mill Germans. Discussions were feverish, ignorance of the outside world astonishing, and nationalism as fervent as ever.

Nor had German officialdom changed much. Obsequious toward the victors, they treated their fellow-Germans with redoubled brutality. I shall long remember the white-jacketed traffic cop in Stuttgart whom I asked for directions. Our conversation was interrupted by the bell of a streetcar, as I had parked my car across the trolley tracks. The German policeman, so kind and helpful to us victorious lords of creation, erupted in a volcano of in-

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vective. Unaware of our ability to understand every insult he shouted at the luckless conductor, he gave the wretch a dressing down I will never forget. The he turned back to us, abjectly apologetic: "That fool did not know he was disturbing Allied persons!"

The Germans' abysmal lack of factual knowledge of the outside world shows the complete failure of Allied information services. Time and again we were confronted with absolute incredulity when we assured the Germans, including those whose educational background should have given them a clearer understanding of non-German problems, that France was still rigidly rationing her citizens, that we had not seen a bit of butter or a drop of milk at our Versailles hotel for the past two months, that England was even more rigorously rationed than France. "But these are victor countries," they would exclaim, "you cannot tell us such stories!" They believed that this story was merely a propaganda trick to console them for their own hardships. That half their food was shipped into Germany by American and British generosity was equally unknown, or when known, was shrugged off with the argument: "We are paying for it through occupation cost anyway."

Nazis everywhere were riding high and aiming higher. The anti-Communist swing of American foreign policy meant an anti-Russian reorientation. The idea seemed to be: whoever is anti-Communist is a fine fellow, and if he is efficient in his field, his previous record shall be conveniently overlooked. We heard a lot of talk about the poor Germans from well-meaning Quakers, theologians, and American Army wives. Of the poor victims of German aggression, there is but little mention. The inconvenient fact that no fewer than 321,000 non-German children are still being frantically sought throughout Germany, where the Nazis obliterated every trace of their antecedents, is also buried in silence.

No German will publically admit as yet that he was ever a Nazi, although the de-Nazification courts, at least in the American zone, lean over backwards in their attempt to let off even flagrant Nazis with purely nominal sentences. What, however, can one expect from the German-manned tribunals, when American authorities systematically reduce sentences of one arch-offender after another? The fantastic Ilse Koch affair, which has recently created something of a stir, was merely one in a long line of similar commutations. I remember distinctly a heated argument one night between a mediocre German writer and an ex-Nazi. Both had served in the German Army until the bitter end, when the Nazi had run away from the Hungarian front and found his way home, and the writer had been taken prisoner in France. Although they disagreed on the merits of the Hitler regime, they admitted that on the whole it had been a good time for them, a feeling they undoubtedly shared with a large majority of Germans.

German morals defy description. The unspeakable housing shortage, accentuated by the wave of German expellees from the East, inevitably created a natural breeding ground for vice and other forms of delinquency. Theft, robbery, rape are almost endemic crimes. The Fraülein situation continues to be bad. So are the petty and not so petty black market activities in which a number of American officials and military personnel are involved. Rationing of chocolate, tobacco, and soap in the PX stores attests the popularity of such business deals. Some PX stores even ration sugar.

The atmosphere created by the two worlds existing side by side in Germany is not conducive to inspiring love of democracy. "For Americans and privileged Germans only," reads the sign on the elevator of one of Stuttgart's office buildings. Special hotels are exclusively reserved for foreign visitors. The J.E.I.A. (Joint Export Import Agency) controls a number of hotels in Germany's major cities. No Germans are admitted to them. Although I myself, for the sake of curiosity, waited for about half an hour in the cozy anteroom of the Stuttgart office, no business of any sort seemed to be transacted there. This seemed to justify the sarcasm of our Swiss friends who had warned us, "They all want us to do business with Germany, but they make it impossible for us to work effectively. Our German buyers and sellers are only too often hopelessly enmeshed in strangling webs of red tape."

Yet it seemed almost incredible that any German business would be able to flourish, when one saw in city after city the mountain-

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ous rubble, the empty windows, the countless ruins. We had read about them, seen them in the newsreels, had heard them described. It was useless. Nothing can possibly convey an adequate impression of the wreck and ruin which has overtaken all major cities of Germany. In agonizing contrast to these scenes of desolation was the pastoral tranquillity of the villages. There not even the men looked quite as starved as they did in the cities. Women and children looked better fed than the menfolk. The number of invalid ex-soldiers was seemingly high, due probably to the dearth of articial limbs, but no special sympathy or help was noticeable.

All occupation forces are deeply resented by the Germans. It would be surprising if that were not the case. Yet, if there is one single victor who is thoroughly hated, it is Soviet Russia. Hitler's propaganda had sown dragon seeds, and the wild excesses of the victorious Russian armies, including countless instances of wholesale rape, proved Hitler right in the eyes of the Germans. The treatment of German war prisoners in Russia, from which the broken and battered survivors still trickle back to Germany, intensified this hatred, shared by all but the German Communists.

As we left Germany for the Swiss frontier, we crossed Lake Constance on a ferry. Behind us in the dusk receded the towers and houses of Meersburg. The almost complete unanimity of German hopes for a third world war which would redeem them as American allies against Russia became a troublesome memory only. Fifteen fateful years seemed to have left the Germans basically unchanged. Bewildered, isolated from the outside world first by their own volition and now by events beyond their control, they still grope futilely towards reality, while getting lost in a maze of ambivalent dreams. The snowclad peaks and the hearty *Gruezi miteinand* with which democratic Switzerland welcomed us were a relief from the stifled atmosphere of a country whose tragically bizarre face still twitches with spasms of lunacy although its body is wrapped in the none-too-tight straitjacket of Allied control.

Lonely baby chick taking a look around the electric incubator of unhatched eggs: "Well, it looks as if I'll be an only child. Mother's blown a fuse!"

—Capper's Weekly

A three-year-old child was listening to his playmates discussing things they had learned in Sunday school.

Joey said: "And do you know that this world is like a balloon, and when God punctures the balloon, this world is going to disappear?"

For a moment everyone was silent, then the three-year-old ran towards his house saying, "Oh, my goodness. I'd better go tell mother!"

A certain sportively inclined gentleman got home far too late from a poker game. As a prudent gesture, he gave the family cook a dollar not to tell his wife what time he came in. But when he encountered his wife, a few hours later, it didn't take him long to discern that his secret was out.

"Mandy," he said reproachfully to the cook, "I didn't think you'd let me down!"

"Now, Mistah Jones," Mandy protested, "I ain' tole de madam a single, solitary thing. She axe me what time you got home, an' I say to her I was too busy gettin' my breakfas' ready t' look at de clock!"

—Lillian Oakley

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REPEAL THE HATCH ACT!

By MAX KNEPPER
Columnist

Apathy perils the electorate

THE so-called "Hatch Clean Politics Act," named for its author, Senator Carl Hatch, of New Mexico, has been on the statute books for more than nine years. This is time enough to balance its value as an instrument for purification of federal elections against its obvious infringement on the political rights and duties of some two million federal workers.

Although the Hatch Act has been declared constitutional, there is no question of its having restricted seriously the rights of federal workers to participate actively in politics. Section 9 (A) of the Act provides:

> No officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or in any agency or department thereof, except a part-time officer or part-time employee without compensation or with nominal compensation serving in connection with the existing war effort other than in any capacity relating to the procurement or manufacture of war material, shall take any *active* (my emphasis) part in political management or in political campaigns.

Anticipating attacks on the constitutionality of the measure, the framers of the Hatch Act sought to guard against its invalidation by providing that subject persons would be free to vote according to their convictions and free, within the privacy of their homes, to express a preference for candidates. This rear-guard action proved successful, for in a dozen court tests on the legality of the Hatch Act, the legislation was consistently upheld.

Probably the most definitive test was the case of the United Federal Workers of America (C.I.O.) and others against Harry B. Mitchell and others, alleging that Section 9 (A) violated rights guaranteed in the first, fifth, ninth, and tenth amendments to the Constitution.

In a decision handed down by the United States Court of Appeals, Washington, D. C., and subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court, it was ruled that the limitations on political activity of government employees was reasonable and within the powers of Congress to impose.

In substance, the decision held that if Congress had power to take political activity out of government employment and promotion (i.e., establish civil service), it likewise had power to take government employees out of politics. The implication is that the government, as an employer, is within its rights in establishing conditions of employment, and, since punishment for violation is merely loss of job, the logic in the judicial affirmation of the Hatch Act appears beyond debate.

Because the act is constitutional, however, does not mean that it is either just or wise. If private industry attempted to prohibit political activity among its employees on their free time, a terrific outcry would be raised, and probably within a very short time legislation would be passed prohibiting such interference by employers. It is at least questionable whether the government, as an employer, has any greater moral right to proscribe political activity to its employees than a private employer. Certainly it cannot be very well argued that prohibition of political action to public employees (in their free time, of course) is not discriminatory legislation. One class of citizens is prohibited from doing that which is legal for the rest.

But the discriminatory aspect, at least for

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the purpose of this article, is not the decisive one. After all, a specious, if not honest, argument could be made that certain privileges enjoyed by federal employees under civil service compensate for loss of certain rights, the one balancing the other.

The important consideration is that by means of the Hatch Act, Congress has removed a sizable segment of citizens from active participation in politics and has set a precedent for similar action by state and local governments. California, for instance, within a year after passage of the federal measure, enacted its own "Little Hatch Act," banning political activity among the state's 40,000 employees.

We thus have the sorry spectacle of democratic government deliberately destroying the very process by which democracy exists—popular participation in politics by all citizens.

The latest authoritative figures on the number of public civilian employees are as follows:

Federal	2,002,000
School district	1,529,000
State	638,000
City	997,000
County & other	603,000
	5,769,000

Since state agencies partially supported by federal funds are also subject to the provisions of the Hatch Act, the number of voters cut out of political activity exceeds two million. Actually, the number is much greater as other governmental jurisdictions have followed the example set by the Hatch Act, either through special legislation or civil service regulations.

Almost all the corruption and abuse existing in government, whether on the federal, state, or local plane, can be directly traced to political apathy on the part of the electorate. The crying need of democratic government is not a curtailment of political activity but a stimulation of it. The Hatch Act merely makes political apathy compulsory for a class of citizens intelligent enough to provide leadership. It makes it legally impossible for the Chief Executive, who is at the same time head of his political party, to staff his administration with party leaders. If he avails himself of the services of capable party men, he then strips his political organization of its key leaders. Either course is destructive of responsible government.

And the sacrifice is needless. The advertised purpose of the Hatch Act was to prevent machine politics, something already achieved by civil service, which had eliminated patronage in most categories of federal workers. The genesis of the measure was really in an alleged remark of the late Harry Hopkins, sometime W.P.A. Administrator, to the effect that "we will tax and tax and tax, and spend and spend and spend, and elect and elect and elect." Vast publicity was given this remark by opponents of the New Deal, which included practically all of the press; the Hatch Act was the outcome. Without the W.P.A. "machine," said these opponents, the New Deal would be defeated. It is hardly necessary to point out that Roosevelt was re-elected twice after its passage, so in that respect the Hatch Act was a complete failure. In preventing political activity by federal workers, however, it has been, on the whole, successful. Few civil servants, particularly those with good jobs or with substantial retirement benefits accrued to their credit, care to jeopardize their employment even to help win campaign issues in which they are vitally interested.

But this is a bad thing for democracy, the health of which depends upon the broadest possible participation in political affairs. In prohibiting political activity to some two million federal workers, the social organism is deprived of participation by a group whose business is government and who should be more politically conscious than any other.

It is quite true that civil service regulations discouraged political activity among federal employees even prior to enactment of the Hatch Act, making political eunuchs out of thousands of American citizens who happened to earn their living in federal employment. But the Hatch Act gave statutory support to this policy and brought under its sway thousands of exempt employees.

The W.P.A. no longer exists, so the original reason for passage of the Act, political sterilization of W.P.A. workers, no longer holds. There should, therefore, be no resistance to repeal of the measure from opponents of the New Deal. Indeed, should the G.O.P. ever regain power, the Republicans

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might no longer find merit in the legislation.

However, even if the W.P.A. or something like it were still a federal agency, it is difficult to see why it is any more corrupt, undemocratic, and subversive to the cause of clean politics for a relief worker to campaign in behalf of candidates who have taken him from the breadline than for a newspaper publisher to editorialize in favor of candidates pledged to reduce surtaxes, or for a manufacturer to contribute to a party pledged to higher protective tariffs. A healthy democracy envisions every citizen *actively* furthering those political principles and candidates which will protect or advance his well-being.

The insidious effect of the Hatch Act is two-fold. It not only prohibits politically conscious citizens from taking part in politics if they happen to be federally employed, but it provides an excuse for the indolent and apathetic to shirk their duties of citizenship during campaign season. The Hatch Act has extended its paralyzing influence beyond the province of federal employment. States, counties, and municipalities have followed suit, immobilizing thousands more. Many such public employees even bring influence to bear on members of their families to desist from political activity.

APATHY

If this trend continues, political control of all levels of government will retrogressively narrow down to minority control by professionals in the hire of special interests. The last Congress, which many persons deplore as one of the most unrepresentative in American history, was elected by little more than one third of the eligible voters. The governing body of the City of Los Angeles was recently placed in power by a 16 per cent vote.

This shameful condition can be duplicated in almost any political jurisdiction in the country. It is often hypocritically deplored in press and pulpit, school and lecture platform, and decried as proof of a degenerative trend in our democracy—this on the day after election. Between the balloting, many of these organs of expression contribute to the political apathy they "deplore" by referring to "politics" and "politicians" in sneering, derogatory terms. As a result, abstention from political activity is an all too common boast among the citizenry. The Hatch Act has been the greatest single factor making for political apathy in recent years.

It will be argued that the measure does not prevent public employees from *voting*. It doesn't—directly. But curtailment of campaigning curtails the vote. Anybody who has had political experience will accept this as an axiom. In a campaign involving controversial issues which draw an army of active campaigners into the field, the election turnout is always good. In other tests, concerned with even graver issues but in which no group has an immediate self-interest, the balloting is usually light. An active political worker is obviously far more likely to go to the polls on election day than a voter who shuns political activity either through ignorance or by political ban.

Legislation prohibiting officeholders from coercing, or even soliciting, subordinates to support candidates is desirable. It goes without mention that public employees should not be permitted to campaign during working hours, a prohibition effective in federal executive departments years prior to the Hatch Act. But voluntary political activity by public employees on their own time has never built or maintained a machine. Civil servants are as diverse in their social and political views as any other category of citizens. Like others, their views depend upon temperament, financial and social background, the opinions of their families and associates, and the impact of political issues on their personal well-being.

For the purpose of this article, more than two dozen federal employees—mostly in the Post Office Department—were asked whether, prior to 1939, they had ever been requested by a superior to work for or against a certain candidate or political party. In each case the answer was negative. Even in W.P.A. days, no instance of a superior organizing campaign workers among subordinates ever came to my attention, although most W.P.A. workers voted for the New Deal for obvious reasons.

At present, due to the large number of privately employed persons, the ratio of public employees to those in private industry is only about 1 to 12. At the moment, therefore, restriction of the political rights of public

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employees may seem a minor consideration as far as the general picture is concerned. But in depression times when the government is forced to provide work directly, as well as through subsidies to state and local agencies, the Hatch Act could very well remove the majority of voters from active political participation, leaving the field to a minority.

It is quite possible in the foreseeable future —given a national emergency—that the government may nationalize mines, railroads, and utilities, which could readily balance the ratio between publicly and privately employed citizens. In this situation the effect of the Hatch Act on political democracy should be apparent to anybody. Extremist groups would be free to campaign actively for their programs, while half or more of the electorate would be forced to keep silent on political issues except in their own homes.

The Hatch Act was supported by most conservatives as a weapon to deprive the New Deal of an element of its support. Someday, however, conservatives may regret its crippling restraint on government workers. In hard times, government employees are a preponderantly conservative influence. Although remuneration is modest, the security and benefits of civil service employment, especially when private employment is depressed and ill-paid, immunize public employees to radical schemes.

Although the second war to make the world safer for democracy has been barely concluded, the political climate today is more hostile to democratic rule than in several decades. With the exception of the Scandinavian countries, England, and the United States, political democracy is not flourishing. Even in the United States, supposedly the strongest bastion of democracy, the signs are not encouraging. There are many powerful influences opposing the healthy functioning of representative government. Military influences in administration, virtual disfranchisement of Negroes and other minorities in some sections of the country, negation of the Bill of Rights by congressional committees, and other signs of the deterioration in political democracy are evident.

To counteract these pernicious influences, the broadest possible participation in politics should be encouraged. Schools, press, pulpit, lecture platform, motion pictures, radio, and every other available public opinion medium should assume responsibility for inculcating the American people with a sense of duty and pride in active participation in politics on every jurisdictional level.

In any such renaissance of American political consciousness, however, removal of the Hatch Act obstacle will be a necessary first step. At a time when the horizons of political democracy are gravely contracting, a measure which bans political activity to more than two million among the most intelligent and responsible citizens of the nation is clearly not in the public interest. Repeal of the Hatch Act should be on the agenda of the Eighty-first Congress.

A little boy went to Sunday school for the first time. His teacher told the class the story of the three Hebrew children, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego. On his return home, his mother inquired what the lesson had been about. Much to her amazement, he replied, "Your shack, my shack, and a bungalow."

—Magazine Digest

A man who discovered the joys of fishing rather late in life became even more insistent than ordinary anglers upon recounting his triumphs to skeptical acquaintances. Encouraged by their thinly veiled hints that he was a liar, he bought a pair of scales, installed them in his library and made his friends watch while he actually weighed his fish.

One evening a neighbor burst in excitedly to borrow the scales. He was back in 10 minutes, his face flushed with delight. "Congratulate me!" he cried. "I'm the father of a 24-pound baby boy!"

—Healthways

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More Than

FIFTY YEARS OF FORUM

Although a new crisis in China and in Chinese-American relations seems about to erupt, the underlying factors in the Chinese situation have changed little in 30 years. If we turn to the FORUM of 1918, we find the same problems: the conflict between North and South, between "parliamentarians" and militarists, corruption, discipline, the necessity for a loan, and for the support of the "Allies."

Gardner L. Harding, in "The Rough Road of Young China," outlines the difficulties of "liberal China." *The chapters still to come—of how liberal China shall extricate herself from the difficult position in which she now finds herself, of whether she shall reject the war that has been thrust upon her, of whether the movement for secession shall gain new fuel from the fires of resentment this episode has everywhere stirred up, of whether the Allies will consent to deal with China as a faction rather than try to receive her genuine allegiance as a self-governing nation—all these are dark questions in a time when all future history is most perversely impenetrable.*

Young China is travelling a rough road, but it is a road that we still must watch and that we in America, at any rate, must follow with sympathetic interpretation. For their leaders follow the path of men who are right—most tiresomely right—but who are most distressingly outmaneuvered whenever they get fairly out in that trackless jungle of reality through which the Chinese nation must find its way if ever it is to be more than a passive mendicant in this still unscrupulous world. If ever China is to rehabilitate herself as a nation, these men are the thin red line of leadership which alone can make that progress secure. I think there will be an end to that road which will some day finally and fully justify our faith in Young China. But for a long time, and we may as well make up our minds to it now, we must justify our confidence by faith rather than by works.

. . . . First and foremost should come a reconstruction of her army. China spends today on her military forces almost $80,000,000 gold a year (she admits that much; there may be even more), and she gets for it in real military strength practically nothing. Her generals do not command her armies; they own them, and they use them for or against the government as their political ambitions happen to turn the scale. It is Young China's outstanding failure in government that it has never been able to impose reform on this inveterate relic of mandarin corruption. With the army purchasable, the heart of the nation has been wrong. If the Allies are to turn Chinese assistance to any useful purpose, if their opportunity for constructive interest in China is really to stabilize the country, they must give plain notice that this system must be ended. A system must be devised and rigidly applied whereby discipline is to be enforced among generals as well as among private soldiers.

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JASPER R. LEWIS

Books in brief

Everyman Looks Forward, by Lancelot Law Whyte (Holt, $2.00), is an exposition of the author's beliefs on world problems today, particularly his theories on a world organization and the need for a new attitude on internationalism. Some of it is sound common sense, some of it rather idealistic for our times. One of his suggestions, the establishment of a single hierarchy of power, is coupled with the "manning of this hierarchy with individuals of appropriate convictions and skills." That last might well be the insurmountable obstacle until such time as man becomes less selfish. It's nice to think about.

Andre Maurois gives us *The Miracle of France* (Harper's, $5.00), which is his version of French history told in popular narrative fashion. Beginning with Caesar in Gaul, here is an easy way to acquire a general knowledge of the France that was. Maurois believes his country will be great again. In the chapters between Gaul and World War II, he tries to explain some of the reasons for the many tragic events in his country's history. If it is not always strictly objective, it is always interesting and sometimes exciting.

BIOGRAPHY

Henry David Thoreau, by Joseph Wood Krutch (Sloane, $3.50), is the first of the American Men of Letters Series. It is mildly biographical and largely a discussion of Thoreau as naturalist, writer, and philosopher. Surprisingly enough, there is considerable speculation by Krutch on meanings and intentions, and reference to other biographers' views on Thoreau. The Walden experience, brief as it was, Krutch thinks was more gesture than adventure; Thoreau's hut was within walking distance of the village, surely not very isolated. The book is, of course, in admirable style, although the jacket blurb quoting the Board of Editors' opinion on it seems hardly unbiased, for Krutch's name leads the Board.

A second volume in the same Series, *Edwin Arlington Robinson,* by Emery Neff (Sloane, $3.50), is biography and critical essay combined in sympathetic and dignified fashion. Neff interweaves the facts of Robinson's somewhat lonely life with his literary efforts to good effect. As is natural, many prominent figures of the literary world of yesterday appear in the pages, from the poet's Harvard days to our own era. The author, professor of English at Columbia University, has made it a human interest document.

In addition to telling the rise to fame of one of the most popular columnists of the day, *The Damon Runyon Story,* by Ed Weiner (Longmans, $3.00), has for its characters other well known members of the newspaper world, the sports fraternity, and that odd if not exclusive group known as "Broadway denizens." Weiner doesn't tell much of Runyon's serious moments or his illness, but he relates many incidents and quotes frequently from Runyon's own original remarks. It is a friend's testimonal, and a guide book to Broadway.

One of the most intriguing stories of recent months is *The Nine Lives of Citizen Train,* by Willis Thornton (Greenberg, $3.50). Spanning the period between 1845 and 1904, the life of George Francis Train bridged the development in our history from Boston

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countinghouses and clipper ships to railroads, revolution in France, Civil War here, pioneering in Australia, Ireland, and our own Wild West. That so much action could be compressed into the life of one man, almost in our own times, seems impossible. Thornton makes it seem matter of fact, but intensely exciting.

Garner of Texas, a Personal History, by Bascom N. Timmons (Harper's, $3.00), is the life story of the former vice president told by his intimate friend. Garner rose from the Texas State legislature to the Washington scene in 1903. Theodore Roosevelt was in the White House. Through the years, as the Democrats were waiting to come into power, Garner's stature in Congress grew, but he seemed to remain a modest, determined politician, serving his Texans as well as he could. Never a popular figure in the nation, Garner seemed relieved to be free of Washington when F.D.R. wanted Wallace for a running mate. Adequately wealthy and more, his life in Uvalde, Texas, is just about what he wants of fate.

The famous "Q" receives praise and affectionate recollection in *Arthur Quiller-Couch,* a Biographical Study, by F. Brittain (Macmillan, $3.50). A neighbor of "Q" in Jesus College, Brittain has personal memories to add to his study of the writings of the British author. A chronological list of "Q's" publications testify to the diversity of subjects and the large volume of his writings.

GENERAL INTEREST

Those who earn their bread by pencil, pen, or typewriter will find a useful volume in *The Home Book of Proverbs, Maxims and Familiar Phrases,* by Burton Stevenson (Macmillan, $20). Nearly 3,000 pages, including an index, offer quotations by subject, with sources and author. It is an ambitious and comprehensive job.

Without passing judgment on their literary merit (for that may be a matter of taste), one may say that in *The Cantos of Ezra Pound* (New Directions, $5.00), it is possible to find erudition, humor, cynicism and, of course, things not expected in print. In this volume are all the Cantos to date, including those written while Pound was in a prison camp in Pisa.

A somewhat refreshingly different slant on American culture is taken in *Made in America,* the Arts in Modern Civilization, by John A. Kouwenhoven (Doubleday, $5.00). The author is interested in the vernacular—the really American in art, and traces the national tradition through technical subjects—machinery, ships, houses. In the telling, literature, art, and architecture come in for discussion, and even jazz has its place in this effort to accept American art for itself, instead of as a by-product and descendent of European standards.

Those who read and admired *New World A-Coming,* will like *Black Odyssey,* the Story of the Negro in America (Scribner's, $3.50). Roi Ottley, author of both books, traces the history of the Negro in America from colonial days to the present. It isn't only the problem of the Southern states, but the different and equally distressing situation in the North. An encouraging part of the book is the recital of the success stories of some Negroes in various fields, particularly in recent years, which takes a little of the sting out of the preceding chapters on slavery with all its brutality.

Thomas D. Clark has turned out a book that will bring smiles and recollections to anyone familiar with country newspapers of a few decades ago. *The Southern Country Editor* (Bobbs-Merrill, $3.50), is a gay review of Southern journalism in the past 80 years. It is true that much of his comment might be applied to the newspapers of other sections, the chapters on Lydia Pinkham and Peruna advertising, for example. But most of it is concerned with the problems peculiar to the South, and Clark portrays these excellently with humor and sympathy, even if at times admitting partisanship or worse on the part of editors who had to please their public.

The part luck has played in history, the common "if" approach, is enlarged upon in *As Luck Would Have It,* by Otto Eisenschiml and E. B. Long (Bobbs-Merrill, $3.00). Taking a group of 15 incidents during the American Civil War, the authors predicate each on the fact that chance dictated some minor event or condition that later resulted in the outcome recorded by history. Some of the "ifs" appear rather farfetched, but there is a good deal of interest and sometimes humor in the situations.

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A very useful book, if you understand the title, is *Do You Know What You're Buying?* by Louis Ludwig (Ziff-Davis, $2.95). It doesn't tell you what brands or makes are better or worse, but it does reveal what is meant by customary terms and names for merchandise from automobiles to wearing apparel. Surprisingly enough, terms that one hears every day are not generally known as far as technical construction goes. There is also some good advice on buying.

Hiram Bingham, better known as a former senator, is listed as discoverer of Machu Picchu in 1911. *Lost City of the Incas* (Duell, Sloan & Pearce, $5.00), is his revised interpretation of the place of Machu Picchu in Peruvian history. It is an absorbing story of exploration, coupled with appraisal of the customs and culture of centuries ago; it is interesting for its material rather than the author's style.

FICTION

The popularity of the historical novel has not waned, and in this lucrative field no era holds more fascination for authors (or readers) than the Elizabethan. In *Roanoke Hundred* (Bobbs-Merrill, $3.50), Inglis Fletcher fictionalizes the founding of the first English settlement in North America. The story centers in Sir Richard Grenville and the stout lads of Devon and Cornwall who made up the 100 pioneers to Roanoke. High adventure is flavored with a touch of romance as the plot unfolds. One of Mrs. Fletcher's Carolina series, this is a fast moving and well written piece.

Jan Westcott's *Captain for Elizabeth* (Crown, $3.00), is a simpler and more popular account of another of Elizabeth's courtiers. Captain Cavendish, his young brother, and their lady loves are the main subjects of the Westcott novel, and their adventures as they sail around the world make a good story. *Captain for Elizabeth* and *Roanoke Hundred* deal with the same period, even with some of the same characters. Comparison is, therefore, tempting. Westcott's book has less historic background and is not as well written as *Roanoke Hundred,* but will very likely prove more popular.

Sylvia Townsend Warner worked on *The Corner That Held Them* (Viking, $3.00), for almost ten years. The resulting novel of life in an English priory at the end of the Middle Ages is a rich and brilliant description of medieval life. The story of forty-odd years in the convent at Oby is distinguished by its life-like characterizations of nuns, priests, bishops, and lay people. An almost uncanny sense of historic perspective rewards the reader as Miss Warner holds a microscope to one small corner of old England. For those who appreciate fine writing and descriptions of medieval life this book is a treasure. Engrossing reading, too.

King Tut and His Friends (Harper's, $2.75), is a book for cat lovers by John Hosford Hickey and Priscilla Beach. Although the silver tabby Persian, King Tut, is the central figure of the book, his feline and canine friends get their share of attention. The authors of *Know Your Cat* and *Know Your Dog* have a delicate touch that will delight those who love their four-footed companions.

A little satire on Russians, American diplomacy, and Americans is Samuel Spewack's *The Busy, Busy People* (Houghton Mifflin, $3.00). The wire-service reporters, the diplomats, the Russian officials and party members, all come in for their share of panning. The official ambassadorial mind is examined at great length but with no reflected credit, and some minor love interest helps the story along somewhat. As a satire of types, the story is delightful; as a commentary on the conflict between East and West, it never hits half as hard as the darts thrown at the characters in it.

Life on the lowest and simplest level, that of the army private engaged in combat, is the theme of Allan Lyon's *Toward An Unknown Station* (Macmillan, $3.00). All the small hopes and fears, the gnawing frustrations, the thoughts and feelings of this indispensable part of the army are vividly and honestly related. Lyon has given us a well-written picture of the small guy, his trials and life.

Bellamy Partridge in *Big Freeze* (Crowell, $2.75), has his hero engaging all the forces of nature, in his fight to build the first Croton dam and aqueduct to New York City. Just to complicate things further, there are lovely

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ladies and crooked New York politics of one hundred years ago. Engineer David Wakeman emerges triumphant in every case for a very interesting picture of metropolitan life in the 1830's.

Although it is classed as a war novel, there is hardly anything of war itself in *The Wine of Astonishment,* by Martha Gellhorn (Scribner's, $3.00). Most of the skirmishing takes place in bedrooms, whether it is the Lieutenant Colonel or his jeep driver, Jacob Levy, who is involved. It is, however, rather a story of deeper meaning, in its development of characters and portrayal of the philosophy of life on the part of individuals of different types.

MISCELLANEOUS

According to E. M. Butler in *The Myth of the Magus* (Macmillan, $3.75), all great prophets, conjurers, magicians, and charlatans are more striking in their likenesses than differences. In the legendary history of almost every people is a mythical hero, and the pattern of his life is followed in the story of most of the men she describes. Zoroaster, Moses, Solomon, Christ, Merlin, Rasputin—all of these have much in common with the legendary figure.

The author sets up a table listing the ten outstanding features common to most legendary figures. These features include: a mysterious origin, a period of wandering, a magical contest, a mysterious or violent death followed by a resurrection. The author proves to her own satisfaction the common basis on which the lives of these characters are based. This is a careful study, full of rich material. It will interest all those who enjoy folk-tales and anthropology and remind the reader of Fraser's *Golden Bough.*

A Westerner, on the occasion of his first visit to Boston, gave the following account of his sight-seeing ventures:

"The bean eaters had a sign on every corner. Here was a plate announcing that in this house John Hancock and John Quincy Adams spent the night on such and such a date; on the next corner a house will be plainly marked as the spot where the wife of General Warren died—to say nothing of the markers of the route taken by the Continentals to Bunker Hill, etc.

"I was very much interested in Boston and rode all around the town, but was particularly interested in one house out near the edge of the city marked as follows: 'This is the house that Paul Revere would have passed if he had gone this way.'"

—*The Haversack*

Some years ago an elderly man was riding a sight-seeing bus up Fifth Avenue. This was his first trip to New York, and he was sitting on the edge of his seat, taking everything in, while the conductor of the tour was calling out the points of interest.

"We are now passing the Astor mansion," he said. The rider, more familiar with the older generation, asked confidently, "John Jacob?" "No!" said the conductor, irritated at the interruption, "Vincent."

Soon the conductor announced, "This is the home of the Vanderbilts." Again the old man apparently spoke out of turn, "Commodore?" This time the fellow fairly barked at the poor visitor, "William H.!"

The man settled back in his seat, apparently duly squelched, but when the guide called out, "This is beautiful Christ's Church."

Grandpa straightened up and, with a twinkle in his eye, asked meekly: "Jesus?"

—*Digest of Digests*

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

COUNTRY COMMENT

Do you remember "The Peaceable Kingdom," celebrated painting by the early Nineteenth Century Edward Hicks? I am looking at a postcard reproduction.

In the foreground is a well-posed group of animals, both wild and domestic, and three small children. I think I can identify two cattle, two calves, a sheep, a lamb, a goat, a dog, a lion, a leopard with spots, a tiger, and a bear. The three children are very young, very tender, very cherubic. All the animals look peaceful and unworried except the lion and the leopard, both of whom are clearly under a sense of strain. The lion, sitting upright in the center of the group, wears an intense, staring expression. The leopard lifts its head with precisely the look of a stern elderly lady librarian who has just overheard whispering in the library.

In the middleground and off to one side are a group of people. With a magnifying glass I make out seven Quaker-looking gentlemen in knee breeches, long coats, and broad triangular hats; four nearly naked Indians in various postures; and, as well as I can determine, the four wives of the Indians, standing side by side and costumed in strangely familiar-looking evening dress. Obviously a friendly parley is going on here. Luxuriant foliage provides a background for the animals, and behind the Quakers and Indians an idyllic vista extends to faintly luminous hills.

How does the text in Isaiah read? To refresh my memory I turn to the eleventh Chapter, familiar in churches at Christmas.

> The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them. And the cow and the bear shall feed; their young ones shall lie down together: and the lion shall eat straw like the ox.

Here, to be sure, in the picture the bear and a cow are munching, neck to neck, on the same stalk of grain. But the question that cries out for answer is this: As soon as the animals are permitted to break their pose and go their respective ways, will the bear indeed be satisfied with grain? Will the lion be content with straw? And will the calves, the lambs, and the children seem less toothsome than they used to seem? Staring obediently yet anxiously into the eyes of Edward Hicks, the lion is plainly worried, and I have little doubt that this is what worries him. Isaiah may be right about the straw, but Isaiah did not say when, and that is enough to put any red-blooded lion in an embarrassing position.

It is the animals, strictly speaking, who represent Isaiah's Peaceable Kingdom. Isaiah said nothing about Quakers and Indians, and Edward Hicks seems to have included them as an afterthought. Yet it is those Quakers and Indians off to one side that in my opinion constitute our real hope. Suppose worse comes to worst in the foreground. Suppose the lion falls upon a cow, the tiger upon a calf, and the leopard lies down gluttonously with the lamb. Suppose each takes a child for dessert. Suppose all this. Make it as bad as you can. Can't the Quakers and Indians go on with their parley? Is there any insuperable reason why they themselves and among themselves cannot set up The Peaceable Kingdom?

ROBERT FRANCIS

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

The THEATRE ARTS

by John Gassner

After sundry skirmishes, the big guns of the theatre began to be heard in a fashion. Broadway brought forth the musical comedies, *Where's Charlie?* and *Love Life*. *Where's Charlie?* is notable for the presence of the redoubtable Ray Bolger rather than for its musicalization of *Charlie's Aunt*. *Love Life* is ambitious in scope as a history of marriage in these states and impressive in presenting another Kurt Weill score. Broadway also imported a noteworthy British production, *Edward, My Son;* it exhibited Tennessee Williams' latest play, *Summer and Smoke;* brought back *Life with Father* in the sequel entitled *Life with Mother;* and addressed itself to social history with Dorothy Heyward's *Set My People Free.*

In a season that began with virtually no distinction, nullifying all expectations to the contrary, these additions could be welcomed as signs that the drought was coming to an end. Still, it could not be said that Broadway patrons found themselves particularly refreshed except by the revived charms of the Clarence Day chronicle and the acting of Robert Morley in *Edward, My Son.* If this statement does not constitute dramatic criticism, it does point to fundamentals. Although excellence is rare enough at any time, it is growingly dependent in our theatre upon convictions or assumptions of mind and spirit which the world situation has not favored. It is not that the lethargy is all encompassing but that we have had no post-war outburst of idealism or return to ideals which have not been considerably dampened by confusion or doubt. *Edward, My Son, Summer and Smoke,* and *Set My People Free,* from which the most could be expected, have provided values one should not lightly dismiss. They are, therefore, most open to examination in so far as they have fallen short of their potential power.

Edward, My Son is the portrait of a unique and yet representative man who responds to a perfectly natural impulse, the paternal one, but who is far too egotistic to keep it within the bounds of common sense. If that were all there is to this play, it would be a minor excursion into humor and pathos, which does not get very far on Broadway. The fact is that the authors, Robert Morley and Noel Langley, looked beyond the old-fashioned psychology books that used to reduce all behavior to the common rule of instinct. They saw their character, Andrew Holt, in the context of society and created him as a small businessman who was vulnerable to the venal component in business. Threatened by the possibility that his cherished little boy (no doubt, a projection of his own considerable ego), would remain lame for life unless taken to Switzerland for an expensive operation, Andrew Holt set fire to his business and collected the insurance on it. Success in his initial effort convinced him that ruthlessness paid off and confirmed him in a pattern of behavior that brought fortune and the peerage. In the course of this dubious career, which enabled him to indulge his son's questionable tendencies, Andrew Holt ruined his son's character and his wife's life; it is only by a ruse that he is deprived of an opportunity to start blighting his little grandson's future.

Peter Ashmore's direction of the production on view at the Martin Beck is as silken and tensile as a spider's web, and it cannot fail to capture the playgoer. Robert Morley is as superb as we expected him to be. His performance is a series of feats, for he has all the

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tricks of theatricalism at his finger tips. Only his uncanny precision gives him away as a stunt artist, and even then his very substantial personality manages to conceal the calculated nature of his virtuosity. Fortunately, moreover, Peggy Ashcroft, playing his luckless wife, does even more. Although she ages perceptibly during the play and works up to scenes of alcoholic debilitation that rarely fail to be theatrical in any performance, Miss Ashcroft portrays an utterly believable human being. Her greatest *tour de force* is her success in making us forget that her performance is a *tour de force.*

Gratification would be an adequate estimate of the English play, however, only if one overlooked its essential character, which is that of a *tour de force* rather than a genuinely convincing drama, a *coup de théâtre* rather than a play which flares into theatre because its life substance is incandescent. Closely considered, *Edward, My Son* constitutes as much of a fabrication for effect as any plot in a Scribe play or an old-fashioned melodrama. Its scenes are calculated, its effects timed, and its framework is artificial, with Mr. Morley appearing in front of the curtain as Andrew Holt playing narrator and, so to speak, tipping off the audience that all this is just a clever piece of theatre. It is plain that the authors are not actually involved in their play or its implications, and neither is Andrew Holt really concerned with his own destiny. Cleverness is all!

The recent very successful revival of Noel Coward's *Private Lives,* in which Tallulah Bankhead excels, is the closest parallel to *Edward, My Son.* Coward's farce-comedy has managed to hold its own for a good many years because it is easy to accept it on its own terms as a game to be played rather than as lives to be recognized and understood. The same is true of Molnar's *The Play's the Thing,* and it is obvious that both pieces belong to a world it is more amusing to contemplate than to accept as one's own. Both deal, moreover, not only with sophisticated society but with such subjects as domestic squabbling and play making that are most attractive when least seriously treated. "Style" is most appropriate and the essence in their case. If they are not presented artificially, they are nothing. *Edward, My Son,* on the contrary, implies reality, a psychological and social reality and is, therefore, shabbily treated when subjected to artifice and exhibited as an actor's holiday.

Summer and Smoke is, of course, work of a different complexion, and its greatest virtue is no doubt its integrity. The play would, indeed, hold up better on the stage; it would certainly sustain its interest with less dilatoriness and dilution if Mr. Williams had not refrained from tying his story into plotty knots. (It is actually a more honest work than *A Streetcar Named Desire.*) If the play has several unconvincing developments, they are present not because the author has tried to hoodwink us or make a dishonest assault upon our emotions but because he had difficulties in pouring his matter into the dramatic medium. What he had to tell us was, by its nature as a chronicle of two lives that paralleled each other more often than they met, a novel. The exigencies of dramaturgy, which call for extreme condensation, weaken the links of motivation in *Summer and Smoke,* but the spirit of the play remains inviolate. The dialogue has the same inviolability and the characterizations are almost painfully real. Williams tells a tale of two lives that were doomed to be polarized at almost every moment that should have brought them together, of people who were never ready for one another at the same time. And Williams is honest enough to fabricate no reasons for this that do not lie in the constitution of the characters, in a girl's genteel prissiness and a young man's talent for getting into scrapes.

In *Summer and Smoke,* Tennessee Williams has returned to the milieu and characters that made *The Glass Menagerie* and *A Streetcar Named Desire* memorable. That is the charge, and it can be substantiated. One can even go further and conjure up shades of his first produced full-length drama, *Battle of Angels,* and his early one-acter, *Portrait of the Madonna.* Once more we have a testament to frustration; once more we find the wraith of a woman going the way of personal perdition, and once more the male protagonist is endowed with a hearty libido. Alma's mother, moreover, is close kin to *The Glass Menagerie* mother, and even more to the broken women of the author's earlier plays.

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Imitation is rarely successful, even when an author imitates his own work, and *Summer and Smoke* lacks the delicacy of the *The Glass Menagerie* and the dramatic drive of *Streetcar*. It is the present writer's painful duty to report that he was slightly bored throughout the first part, and irritated by the scenes concerning the young hero's affair with a torrid girl of Mexican extraction. He was also scornful of both the easy way in which the young man's father was removed from the story by a pistol shot and the manner in which the hero was crowned with a glorious scientific achievement, for which he was not given a shred of endowment earlier in the play. To top matters, the author seemed to be heralding an undiscernible profundity of poetic vision throughout the evening by keeping before us the statue of a winged figure representing eternity. It is difficult to know what eternity has to do with a girl's conversion from frigidity to mundane passionateness.

The play does not quite materialize as drama in spite of such scenic display as Jo Mielziner provides, such musical accompaniment as Paul Bowles was employed to compose, and such heroic efforts of acting as Margaret Phillips was called upon to deliver and did deliver. In truth, I very much fear that *Summer and Smoke* only brings out the weaknesses I have suspected in its author for a long time—an insufficient exertion of intellect to match his splendid talent for humanizing characters and a fondness for capitalized Art that falls somewhat short of maturity.

If virtue were properly rewarded, *Summer and Smoke* would be a masterpiece, instead of being simply a worthy work that fails to come off. That this miracle does not happen, and that it is possible to be quite severe toward its various limitations, is a provocation to enquiry, and I am inclined to believe that an investigation would reveal one major reason: Mr. Williams had much to show us but little to tell us this time. Reality concerned him as strongly as ever before, but he could place no positive interpretation on it. He had much to deplore in the life he was evoking but nothing to promote and nothing to challenge. A notable piece of dramatic writing was aborted in *Summer and Smoke,* not by an author's dishonest practice or ineptness, nor by a lack of those virtues for which Williams is distinguished from other playwrights, but by an inanition of the bloodstream that characterizes our generation.

This was not quite the case with Dorothy Heyward's *Set My People Free.* Mrs. Heyward's warm sympathies with the Negro have been known to us since the dramatization of *Porgy* with her late husband Du Bose Heyward. She is the noblest type of Southerner who disproves many of the charges raised against Southerners in the North. It is quite remarkable indeed that of all playwrights it is Mrs. Heyward who should have chosen to memorialize an early nineteenth century Negro revolt, and to this task she has brought a warm heart and an understanding head. Whatever reservations she may have concerning the bloodshed entailed by any uprising, she has treated the self-appointed deliverer, Denmark Vesey, with respect and has given him heroic proportions; these were completely humanized by Juano Hernandez, who is perhaps the most appealing actor we have seen for many years. The provocations to revolt are honored; the biblical inspiration of Vesey is fully realized in Mrs. Heyward's portrait, and in general it is the universal human passion for freedom that is lifted high in her play. Moreover, Mrs. Heyward, who has commendably refrained from dividing her people into sheep and goats, pays as much attention to another hero, George Wilson, the head slave of a congenial slave owner, as she does to Vesey. Whereas Vesey follows a single-tracked idea to its logical conclusion of revolt and dies a martyr to his cause, George is a man divided between loyalty to his people and personal devotion to his master and friend. Vesey bought his collaboration in the plot at the price of postponing the revolt to one day after George's master will have left Charleston. When the illness of his master's child delays the family's departure, George's anxiety causes him to betray the uprising. George is that strange hero, as real today as he has been in the past, who stands between two sides in a social conflict, who recognizes the existence of an evil but dreads the greater evil that can result from a social conflagration. He is that renegade of good will and of divided conscience who is a familiar figure of our time.

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As played by the redoubtable actor Canada Lee, George Wilson is a memorable character. Through his dramatically realized complication, *Set My People Free* manages to evoke a host of troubling thoughts concerning the struggles of our own time that have agitated the novels of Koestler, Malraux, and Lionel Trilling. Although Mrs. Heyward deals with a situation remote in time, her play is profoundly contemporary. The Theatre Guild production, staged by the young director Martin Ritt, helps to enforce this interpretation by presenting the story with a minimum of period costuming, pageantry, and dialect.

Nevertheless, both as play and production, *Set My People Free* is too tepid for its material, and one may get the impression that a tempest brewing within it is being somehow smothered. The Guild's production is overpolite and too formal, as if the Guild's heart were somehow disengaged; some want of authenticity damages the staging. Moreover, the drama is almost as divided as George Wilson. The writing never quite achieves the expected eloquence, the provocations to revolt are barely represented, and the actions of Vesey and George often seem more fortuitous than inevitable. Connections between the different parts of the action are rather perfunctory, and the third act marks a decline in the play's interest. Such a decline invariably occurs when a playwright has an only dimly conceived premise. Mrs. Heyward is so divided in her sympathies for Vesey and George, as well as for the attitudes they represent, that we are not quite sure where we stand, what sides we should take, what illumination is in store for us. The play becomes a fluctuation between two standpoints rather than an ascent.

Our present state of mind is conducive to neither affirmativeness nor denials of a truly passionate nature. We are overpowered by neither hope nor despair; we are at the most mildly optimistic or mildly troubled. Neither the heights nor the depths are for us at present, and in the theatre this generally spells mediocrity of spirit even in the case of efforts that are nobly conceived and quite ably executed. This is one more example of the sensitivity of the barometer which is theatre. Perhaps it is for this reason that the dramatic *élan* is more in evidence in France than in America. Perhaps it will also flare up in Germany once that nation recovers from the coma into which its experiences have driven it.

The regular Sunday morning service was being broadcast in Mitchell, South Dakota. The pastor said, "Let us communicate with the Lord."

The radio audience was amazed to hear a telephone operator cut in with the remark, "Let me have another line, please. My circuits are all busy."

—*American Legion Magazine*

The amount of lipstick used by American women each year would paint 40,000 barns bright red.

Bobby, age 6, was given a real watch for his birthday. Proudly he strolled up and down the street past his home stopping every moment or two to draw the watch from his pocket and look at it. But the biggest moment of the day came when his little cousin asked him what time it was.

Studying his watch, with great dignity, Bobby replied: "Two inches to four."

—*Lookout*

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Neon Sign

They tell me you are animate of gas
prisoned in bending tubes that let you spell
lurid words against the sky. The glass
that forms your angry orthographic cell
seems frail device to make a shaken race
wince in nostalgic wish for ancient peace
among the quiet stars. There was a grace
touching the world at eventide when trees
could lean their hieroglyphs upon the moon
and make a poem of silence. You shattered this.

You turned the dark into a brazen noon,
making a visual italicis
wherever the tortured eye may dart in flight.

Does your designer, man without a name
who dared invade the privacy of night,
read his doom in curving words of flame?

The Quiet Years

The quiet years may come again,
The gentle winds may blow once more;
Peace has a way with the ears of men,
Muting the memoried noise of war.

Music may lose its blatant blare,
Traffic recover its softened tread,
Loudness be conquered everywhere . . .
And sleep return to sound-tossed bed.

The moon may watch the creeping grass,
A million little silver flames,
Lick at what loud men brought to pass,
Bury their deeds, their shrill red names.

The grass, as silent as the moon,
May heal the earth's explosion scars;
Again the clatter of bowl and spoon
Drown memory's clang of iron bars.

The proud still days may halo light
On chainless hope as man awakes;
And the only noise through any night
May be the sound that freedom makes.

—GORDDEN LINK

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YES!

FORUM: *Shoul*

Relations V

By CARTER GREENHOUSE

IN recent months there have been unmistakable signs that our relations with Franco Spain are being reconsidered in Washington. Early in October both Senator Gurney, of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and ex-Postmaster James Farley returned from visits to Spain full of advice on how to restore her to the Western European family. Secretary of State Marshall conferred with Ernest Bevin and Robert Schuman on the advisability of including Spain in E.R.P. and of restoring ambassadors to Madrid.

In spite of Franco's continuing dictatorship, it is the belief of our diplomatic experts that Spain may be a valuable ally for us in the years ahead. For this reason, the restoration of diplomatic relations with Spain has been urged. There is no valid reason for withholding recognition any longer. We should obviously take steps immediately to credit an ambassador to Spain.

The American reader is, of course, familiar with the general outlines of the Spanish Civil War. Until it was overshadowed by Hitler's invasion of Poland, there was probably no European event so fervently followed in this country as the war in Spain. The intervention of the Axis Powers on one side and of the Soviet Union on the other, the labels of "Fascist" and "Red," the gallantry of the International Brigade and the stupidity of London, Paris, and Washington, all made their impressions on our people. Even today Americans are unable to think clearly and unemotionally about the Spanish Civil War. This is even truer, of course, of the French and the British, who were closer to the conflict in distance and in sympathy.

Yet our sympathies, however noble, cannot be allowed to blind us today to our best interest, and Spain's best interest.

In pursuit of our traditional policy of isolation, the United States, through its application of the Embargo Acts, refused to aid the then legitimate government of Spain in 1936. This undoubtedly helped Franco win his revolution. From July, 1936, to April, 1939, the United States maintained a "hands-off" policy with regard to Spain, despite the sympathy of many Americans for the Loyalist cause. All this is now water over the dam. Nor is there any useful purpose served in discussing the role that Great Britain and France played in Spain's Civil War. Suffice it for our purpose to say that even before Franco had entered Madrid, Great Britain and France recognized his regime as the lawful government of Spain. And on April 1, 1939, the very day that Franco announced his final victory, the United States followed suit with its recognition of the Franco government. Great Britain, France, and the United States wasted no time in appointing ambassadors acceptable to the Generalissimo.

Nor did the great democracies hesitate to offer Franco material and financial aid for the reconstruction of his devastated country and, incidentally, for the strengthening of his iron grip on his unfortunate countrymen. Less than four months after the war was over, the United States undertook to supply Franco with a $13,350,000 credit, guaranteed by the Export-Import Bank, so that Spain could get urgently needed cotton. The cotton so procured amounted finally to nearly 250,000 bales, and helped Franco defy the overtures of the democracies from that time on. Arrangements with France for the turning over of $40 million in gold belonging to the Spanish Republican government completed the setting up of the Franco regime. From April, 1939, until the end of the Second World War, all the diplomatic efforts of the United States were directed at maintaining friendly relations with Franco, to keep him from joining the war on the side of the Axis. To this end, first Ambassador Weddel, and

[*Continued on page* 358]

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We Re-establish h Spain?

NO!

By INEZ FRENCH

MY opponent has presented with some clarity an argument of sheer opportunism, of the now popular "realistic" school of politics. I shall show that his case is neither so opportune nor so realistic as cynics would have us think. The affirmative of this discussion is based on old-fashioned and mistaken premises about balance of power politics and about military strategy. In an atomic age, balance of power will in no way be determined by the *number* of states lined up on one side or the other. Nor will the geographic location of states such as Spain be of any importance whatever. During the Napoleonic wars, Spain was a landing bridgehead for the British. If we are destined to suffer through another war, we shall need no such bridgeheads. Much argument could be avoided and much wrong thinking corrected if our official and unofficial strategists would get these facts firmly in mind.

In 1948, Franco Spain is an anachronism —an Axis Power in a world which fondly believes that the Axis is dead forever. Franco is a fascist dictator, and modern Spain under his rule is a totalitarian dictatorship. These facts we must not forget.

Most of us remember the agony that was Spain's Civil War. We remember the Italian divisions that were promised to Franco even before rebellion began. We remember Spain as a proving ground for the German air force —with living, suffering Spaniards as targets for German air raid practice. We remember the aid that the Soviet Union sent to the Loyalists—aid that gave the Communists a predominant position in the Loyalist movement as the struggle wore on.

We are less likely to remember the sorry role played by Great Britain, France, and the liberal Roosevelt administration in the United States. Neutrality and our precious embargo kept the legitimate government of Spain from receiving arms to stop the rebellion. We are less likely to remember, too, that there was more than a hint that the great democracies looked forward to a Franco victory, to a "stable" government for Spain. When superior force won out, the United States rushed to welcome Franco to the family of nations, understanding too late that he stood on the other side of the fence.

Franco could never have come to power in Spain without the aid of the Axis Powers—Germany and Italy. He might never have gained his victory without the tacit but unmistakable aid of the western democracies, including the United States. He took control by force and he kept control by force, and to this day his living opponents are imprisoned in countless Spanish dungeons.

This dictatorship, moreover, has been a curse to modern Spain. There is almost no evidence, even from supporters of the Franco regime, that Franco has helped Spain or the Spanish people. There are still guerrillas fighting in the far-flung provinces. Secret police use gangster tactics to keep such order as there is. The new regime has not been able to bring political stability to Spain. Nor has Franco helped his country economically. In the years since the end of the Civil War, the people of Spain have suffered untold hardships; many of them have neither adequate food, clothing nor shelter. Both economically and politically, then, the Franco regime has failed.

Franco's regime is neither democratic, popular, nor efficient. It was once the fashion to say of Mussolini that he made Italian trains run on time; unquestionably he introduced a degree of efficiency into Italy. Hitler's gains for the German people were also tangible; under the Third Reich, Germans gained economic advantages and political victories as the Versailles Treaty was abandoned. But of Franco there is almost no word of praise. He

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then Carleton J. H. Hayes bent all their efforts.

This policy bore fruit during the period of our greatest danger from Germany and Italy. In view of Spain's strategic location at the gateway to the Mediterranean, there can be no doubt that the United Nations benefited from Franco's war-time policy, term it non-belligerency or neutrality or what you will. This does not mean that Franco was on our side. Far from it! In countless small ways, he aided the Axis up to the moment it became clear that the United Nations would win the war. All I mean to say is that our opportunist policy of maintaining diplomatic relations with Franco Spain from 1939 to 1942 helped prevent Franco from strengthening Germany still further. Of this there can be no doubt. Those who wish to criticize our policy must go back further, to the conduct of our relations with Republican Spain during the Civil War. Once Franco was firmly in the saddle, we followed the path of wisdom in our relations with him. We should continue to do so today.

When and why did we alter our policy toward Spain? At the end of the war, we were persuaded again by expediency that a show of unity with the liberals of the world against fascist Spain would be a good policy. We no longer had anything to gain from Franco, or so we then thought. On the contrary, our friendly relations with Spain were gist for the propaganda mill of the Soviet Union, which had helped the Loyalists and was still bitterly opposed to Franco. For this reason, we went along with the majority of the United Nations in censuring Spain for her totalitarian, Axis-sponsored government.

Our note of March 11, 1946, summed up our position from the end of the war to that date:

> The government of the United States has repeatedly made clear its attitude in regard to the present regime in Spain. It supported the resolution in San Francisco introduced by the Mexican delegation to the effect that a country should not be eligible to membership in the United Nations if its government had been assisted to power by the armed forces of countries which fought against the United Nations. The United States was a party to the Potsdam Declaration, applying this principle in specific terms to Spain.
>
> The United States, moreover, supported the Panamanian resolution adopted in January, 1946, at the first meeting of the General Assembly, to the effect that the members of the United Nations Organization should act in accordance with the letter and the spirit of these declarations in the conduct of their relations with Spain. . . . .
>
> While the government of the United States feels strongly that a change of regime in Spain is long overdue, it is compelled to re-iterate that it is for the Spanish people themselves in their own way to bring about such a change. It is the earnest hope of the government of the United States that the Spanish people will bring about such a change at the earliest possible moment and by peaceful means. . . . .

JOINT STATEMENT

Also in March, 1946, the United States, Great Britain, and France issued a joint statement to the effect that with Franco in control of Spain:

> . . . . the Spanish people cannot anticipate full and cordial association with those nations of the world which have, by common effort, brought defeat to German Nazism and Italian Fascism which aided the present Spanish regime in its rise to power and after which the regime was patterned.

At the same time, the United States published its White Book on Spain's collaboration with the Axis during World War II.

On April 10, 1946, Poland formally raised the subject of what to do with Franco in the United Nations Security Council. For the next eight months, discussion raged in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. Poland, sponsored by the Soviet Union, demanded that the members of the United Nations sever diplomatic relations with Spain. The Western Powers, on the other hand, were hoping that the regime would give way peacefully and voluntarily without raising fears of civil war. A sub-committee appointed to investigate rumors of Spanish preparations for war and Spanish research on atomic weapons found that Spain was not engaged

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in atomic bomb research and that "no threat to the peace has been established."

When the issue was raised again in December of the same year, Poland again urged a diplomatic break with Spain. The United States countered with a proposal to bar Spain from United Nations agencies and conferences and to "suggest" resignation to General Franco. Both these proposals were defeated and a Belgian compromise plan was adopted, by a vote of 34-6, with 13 abstentions. According to the terms of the compromise, the General Assembly was to recommend that member states withdraw their heads of mission without breaking diplomatic relations with Franco. His regime was barred from all United Nations functions and the Security Council was to reconsider the issue if the regime had not disintegrated "within a reasonable time."

U. N. RESOLUTION

Unfortunately, this half-hearted measure enforced Franco's government and rallied the Spanish people behind him against foreign "interference." Nonetheless, up to this writing the United States has gone along with and supported the United Nations' recommendations. The voluntary retirement of Ambassador Norman Armour from Madrid before the adoption of the Belgian compromise made it unnecessary for Washington to recall an ambassador, and the American embassy has remained under a chargé d'affairs.

This, in brief, is the history of American relations with Franco Spain since the day Franco announced his victory. There is absolutely no indication that the Franco regime in Spain has been appreciably weakened by our lukewarm disapproval since the establishment of the United Nations. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that continuing United Nations disapproval has strengthened Franco's position at home. Now our policy in regard to Spain can have only one of two goals: to maintain the Franco government or to eliminate it. If we wish to maintain it (and sometimes it looks as though we do), then we must by all means re-establish full relations with the Spanish government. If we wish to eliminate it, our policy is likewise misguided, since the Franco regime shows no more signs of weakness than it did in 1946. Either way, our policy needs careful revision.

Several factors underlie current indications that Washington would like to restore full diplomatic recognition to the Franco government. According to international law, custom, and long usage, recognition of a foreign government by no means implies approval of its internal regime. In the long years of Hitler's cruel and bitter rule over Germany, the United States maintained official relations with the German government. Current disapproval of some of the Soviet's policies does not mean that we contemplate withdrawing our ambassador from Moscow. Spain is an independent and sovereign nation and Franco is unquestionably the Chief of State in Spain. According to well-known international jurisprudence:

> Recognition of a new head or Government by no means implies the recognition of such Head or Government as the Legitimate Head or Government. Recognition is, in fact, nothing else than the declaration of other States that they are ready to deal with a certain individual or group of individuals as the highest organ of a particular State, without prejudice to the question whether such individual or group of individuals ought, or ought not, to be considered to be the legitimate Head or Government of that State. . . . .

Non-recognition of Franco in Spain represents a complete failure to face reality; our continuing half-recognition is even more unrealistic.

Our basic policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states is also strained with regard to Franco Spain. We have repeatedly declared that under no circumstances would we interfere in Spain's domestic affairs, and, so far, we have confined ourselves to occasional advice to the Spanish people urging the *peaceful* elimination of Franco.

Indeed, even if we were to decide on intervention, it would be difficult for the United States to depose Franco at this juncture. The truth of the matter is that to most Americans, Franco's government is preferable to a Communist dictatorship in Spain, and the status quo is preferable to another Spanish Civil War. The United States State Department

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and the War Department are always concerned lest uncertainties in Spain set off a powder train. Intervention, then, is out on two counts: (1) theoretically we do not want to intervene; and (2) if we did, we would be afraid to depose Franco at this time.

Another factor governing our relations with Franco is our current policy of pouring money into Western Europe for reconstruction. From the beginning, our view has been that *all* of Western Europe must be helped to economic recovery, or reconstruction will be impossible. Italy and Western Germany have been included in our plans. There seems to be no logic in the exclusion of a country that did not even fight against us in World War II. If the recovery of Europe depends on the recovery of all its component parts, then Spanish recovery and reconstruction is important to us.

Furthermore, exclusion from the Marshall Plan means continuing suffering for the Spanish people, most of whom were no more guilty of the Spanish Civil War than we were. There seems to be no valid reason for lasting punishment of the little man in Spain, particularly with the American occupation forces doing all they can for the little man in Germany, regardless of his war guilt.

All these factors have convinced the United States government that our policy toward Spain is not practical. As it stands to date, our half-recognition of Franco has not weakened his government; it has not hastened peaceful evolution to a more acceptable Spanish regime; it has not made the United States popular with the Spanish in Spain or in exile. On the other hand, it has prevented Spanish recovery; it has kept Franco from joining us as an ally and has given the Soviet Union a talking point for propaganda against the Western Powers.

These statements are not premises; they are facts. And because of these facts, we should take immediate steps toward the acceptance of Spain into the Western European family of nations. Today, the foremost threat to the peace of the world is not Spain but the Soviet Union and its expansion westward into Europe. A new balance of power is shaping in the world. As the United States spars verbally with Russia, it behooves us to have all of Western Europe on our side. It is by no means out of the question that Franco Spain could come to terms with the Soviet Union, and Spain against us would indeed threaten the safety of the United States.

The strategic importance of Spain is unquestioned. Because of her position at the gateway to the Mediterranean, we were forced to conciliate Franco throughout World War II. Landing rights on Spanish airfields are important today for United States commercial airlines; tomorrow they may have military importance as well.

Because of Spain's strategic importance, another civil war might be catastrophic for the Western Powers. The Soviet Union will welcome and support any attempt to establish a Communist dictatorship in Spain—a dictatorship which would, of course, ally itself with the nations behind the Iron Curtain. It is obviously in our best interest to strengthen and stabilize a Spanish government which will ally itself with us in the years ahead.

For practical reasons, then, we should reestablish full diplomatic relations with Franco. We must recognize the status quo, whether or not we like the Franco regime. Many misguided liberals as well as Soviet sympathizers oppose this step on the grounds that it is "reactionary." As I said earlier, if our policy toward Franco has been wrong, it was wrong not in 1948 but in 1936, when we helped *El Caudillo* to power. Today, all the wishing in the world will not depose him. As a full member in the family of nations, with hope for economic recovery, Spain will be in a far better position to oust the fascist-like Franco regime. An American Ambassador in Madrid can bring to difficult Spanish-American relations experience, intelligence, and tact, plus the prestige and dignity of his high office. In view of the present troubled international situation, we must take immediate steps to accord full recognition to Franco Spain.

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has maintained his grip on the Spanish people not because of his personality nor even because of his authority, but because of brute force plus some external factors. The Spanish

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fear civil war and possible communism even more than they fear Franco. Groups in open or covert opposition to *El Caudillo* still differ so much among themselves that they can plan no unified resistance. Last, but by no means least, the aid Franco has received from Great Britain and the United States since his accession to power has been a major factor in his security. Those who, like my opponent, think of Franco Spain as our ally in a war with Russia, bend every effort to maintain in Spain the dictatorship of General Franco.

It is important for our discussion that the issue we face be made crystal clear. It can be simply worded: shall we continue to appease Franco and establish even more friendly relations with a fascist dictatorship? Both friends and foes of the Franco regime have tended to becloud the question.

Our attitude toward Franco must not be confused with our attitude toward Catholicism. It is unfortunately true that many high dignitaries of the Church were on the Rebel side during the war and that Franco rallied his forces "to save the Church." Also unfortunate was the destruction of church property and the murder of religious by the Loyalists. Nonetheless, many Loyalists were, and are, good Catholics; even some clerics remained on the side of the government. The linking of the Franco regime with Catholicism does Catholicism no good. Reports of indignities suffered by Protestants and of anti-Semitism tend to reflect on the Church in Spain. The religious question must not influence our thinking.

Nor must we be misled by charges that the Loyalists were, and are, Communists and that if Franco falls, a Communist dictatorship will take his place. Only as the Civil War dragged on did the Communists take a predominant place in the Loyalist ranks. Today, although the Communists are naturally in opposition to Franco, so are many moderates, monarchists, and socialists. We must not continue to support one dictatorship merely because we fear that another may supplant it. The people of Spain, individualistic and religious as they are, will hardly jump into the arms of waiting Russia, unless we finally force them to do so. Communism or the threat of communism is not an issue in this debate.

As my opponent has pointed out, the United States already maintains diplomatic relations with Spain; all that is missing is an ambassador to Madrid. The appointment of an American ambassador today would be an excessive display of good will toward a nation that shows us no good will. It would be a slap in the face to our Spanish exiles, to liberals in every country of Europe, and to the United Nations.

Herblock in *The Washington Post*

"If Anyone Says Anything, Just Say 'Anti-Communist'"

What have we to gain from such a step? First of all, say those who want full diplomatic relations re-established, we shall gain the gratitude of Generalissimo Franco. This is naïve. When we withheld aid from the legitimate government of Spain during the Spanish War, we did not earn Franco's gratitude. Nor did he bother to publish the facts on our aid to him in the days when he first became Chief of State. An out-and-out opportunist and politician, Franco will use the United States to his best advantage and stab us in the back when it suits his needs.

Secondly, this step is supposed to earn for us the gratitude of the Spanish people. This is even less likely. The Spanish liberals bear us

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no love because of our sorry role in 1936-1939; the reactionaries cannot forgive us for not welcoming Franco Spain into the family of nations. No Spaniard welcomed the inept and half-hearted interference of the United Nations in 1946. Even those who support the Franco government, then, will hardly be impressed by our belated appointment of a Spanish Ambassador. And those who suffer under Franco will add still another grudge to their list against the United States. Economic advantages accruing to Spain will be marked as a Falange achievement and will simply serve to strengthen Franco's hated regime.

Thirdly, the full recognition of Franco Spain will supposedly secure for us an ally against the Soviet Union. This argument presupposes that the time has come to abandon hope of friendship with Russia and to prepare actively for World War III. It is my belief that this notion is premature. This argument supposes further that Franco's loyalty can be secured. But history tells us otherwise. During the Civil War, the Axis Powers ensured a Franco victory in Spain, and to these powers Franco owed his leadership. Yet during World War II he gave the Axis Powers as little aid as possible; he remained "non-belligerent" and then neutral, and finally, when the time was ripe, deserted his erstwhile allies for the victorious United Nations. Franco is just as likely to turn on us as he was to turn on Germany and Italy. Those who believe that Catholic Spain and Communist Russia could not come to an agreement forget the nature of the men at the heads of these states; forget, too, that fascism and communism joined hands once before, in 1939.

Our possible gains from re-establishing full diplomatic relations with Spain are meager indeed. Our losses are far more tangible and far more important. At this moment, the United States stands before the world as the champion of democratic liberalism. Many if not most of the peoples of Europe feel that the United States is their friend. Against this concept, the Soviet Union does its best to portray the United States as the center of reactionary capitalism and a friend of fascism. Our full recognition of Franco Spain would add fact to Russian propaganda. Liberal Europeans would lose their respect for the United States and would begin to wonder whether the Soviet Union was perhaps right after all. The European reaction that greeted Marshall's very tentative efforts to revise United Nations' rulings on Spain illustrate this premise clearly. The respect of Europe is worth more than the dubious gratitude of General Franco.

Further, this step would rule out any possibility of a rapprochement with Soviet Russia and would confirm her leaders in their belief that we are actively preparing for World War III.

There is still at this writing a chance that the Spanish people may overthrow Franco, consolidate the opposition and restore a liberal Spanish government to power. All possibility of such a step will be eliminated if and when we extend full recognition to Franco and give economic aid to his regime.

Finally, such bare-faced expedient action on our part will damage the moral dignity of the United States; to our lamentable record during the Spanish Civil War will be added still another black mark.

There is no valid justification for re-establishing full diplomatic relations with a one-party fascist dictatorship which gave ample aid to our late enemies. My opponent points to our aid to Italy and Western Germany without recognizing that the enemy regimes in those countries have been eliminated. Our quarrel is not with the Germans, nor with the Italians nor, today, with the Spanish. It was, and is, with those regimes which started World War II, and we must fight for their final and complete liquidation.

My opponent would like to see all Western Europe united, but he forgets that the nations of Western Europe will not willingly unite with Franco's government. He would like to see us add an ally against the Soviet Union, but he leans on a very weak reed. He argues that if our policy were ever wrong, it was wrong during the Spanish Civil War, but he forgets that two wrongs never make a right. He assumes that one dictatorship is as good as another, but forgets that in Spain we are not confronted with a choice between dictatorships.

Morally, politically, and economically, any revision of our policy toward Spain in the direction of leniency will be a serious mistake.

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CONGRESS DEBATES:

Aid To China

THE desperate situation of the Chinese Nationalist government makes certain that one of the first concerns of the new Eighty-first Congress will be additional aid to China.

Last spring, when Congress was debating the Marshall Plan, this same problem arose. Senator Vandenberg and the State Department felt that the Chinese problem should be considered separately, and that it should not be confused with the European Recovery Act, since conditions in China were vastly different from those in the Marshall Plan countries. The Marshall Plan bill passed the Senate without any provisions for Chinese aid. The House, however, over the strenuous objections of General Marshall and Senator Vandenberg, made the Economic Cooperation Act an omnibus bill, including China, Turkey, and Greece. The representatives made it clear that unless China was included, there might be no Marshall Plan.

The Italian elections were drawing near and the deadline for European aid was at hand. To save time, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recognizing the inevitable, unanimously favored aid to China. This measure provided $363 million for relief and rehabilitation, and $100 million which the Chinese government could use for military supplies if it so desired. This latter sum was increased in conference committee to $125 million.

The editors of FORUM are reprinting this Senate debate because most of the arguments, pro and con, are sure to crop up again when Congress reconsiders additional Chinese aid. The main opposition came from two sides. On one side were those who were not happy to see millions in aid going to a government allegedly inefficient, corrupt, and unrepresentative. They felt that one condition for receiving aid should be a broadening of the Nationalist government. They wished some guarantee that the money would aid the Chinese people rather than line the pockets of government officials, as seemed to have been the case with previous aid. These Senators voted for the bill reluctantly, since they recognized that the present Chinese government, with the possibilities for improvement, was better than a Communist regime.

The old-time isolationists objected to any aid to China, pointing out that the country was so vast, and the economy so disorganized, that we would only be throwing money down a rat hole. They felt that any aid short of ruining our own economy would be insufficient. They also feared that the provisions for military aid would be merely the first of a long series of involvements in the Far East, which might perhaps end with American troops following American guns. Their main objection seemed to be, "What concern is China to us, anyway?"

The main answer of the proponents of the measure was the simple, practical question: "Do we want China, with its vast area, its 457 million people, its huge natural resources, and its strategic bases, to fall under Communist control?"

Below are excerpts from the Senate debate on Chinese aid.[1]

* * *

Mr. VANDENBERG, Republican, Michigan. Mr. President, I present S. 2393, a bill to promote the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of the United States by providing aid to China. It is recommended by a unanimous vote of the Committee on Foreign Relations. It is supported by every American instinct to sustain independent governments against aggression, and free peoples against conquest. It is sustained by the rich, historic tradition of American friendship for the Chinese people. Its advisability, at this

[1] *The Congressional Record, Senate,* Vol. 94, No. 59, pp. 2765-2799.

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critical moment in the story of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is so unavoidable that I believe it unnecessary to do more than report the basic facts, and then to take the Senate's decision. . . . .

China was one of the heaviest sufferers from the bludgeon blows of World War II in which she was our ever-faithful ally against the Axis —bearing the cruel brunt of Japanese attack and ruthless occupation, yet always refusing all appeasing opportunities for a separate and expedient peace. The victory against the Axis, however, did not end her grueling jeopardy. The fruits of victory turned to ashes on her lips. She has since been riven by civil war in which her government has been under constant and powerful attack by armed Chinese Communists—a major victim of that conspiracy of aggression which undermines the peace of this unhappy earth.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

The accumulation of these strains—first, 8 years of war; second, long Japanese occupation; third, Communist rebellion—would have long since broken a people less devoted to their ideals, and a chief of state less grimly tenacious than Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. I pay my humble but deepest respect to the tremendous patriotic labors and to the seasoned integrity of this great and courageous leader, who has sustained his responsibility for democratic ideals, through thick and thin, against overwhelming odds. Come what may, I give him my hopes and prayers for his success in behalf of a liberated China and the progressive freedoms of a liberated Chinese people. . . . .

The Chinese Nationalist Government has long been recognized by the United States. It has been recognized by every member of the United Nations where China sits as a permanent member of the Security Council. And this is important—it was specifically recognized by Soviet Russia in 1945 when the Kremlin agreed "to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be given to the National Government as the Central Government of China."

This pledge has been honored only in its breach. Instead, Soviet Russia, for example, has stripped Manchuria of vast industrial equipment estimated at a value as high as $2,000,000,000. It has rendered none of the moral support or material aid it promised. On the contrary, although its direct connection with the Communist civil war is debated in some quarters, it is difficult for realists to make this discrimination—in the light of known infiltration and known subversion, among other things. While the National Government has taken initial steps toward practical democracy through the promulgation of the constitution and the election of a National Assembly, the Chinese Communist rebels aim at totalitarianism; and the Chinese Communist propaganda has been bitterly anti-American and directly follows the Moscow party line regarding all American policies. Not all rebels are Communists. There is the familiar coalition with other antigovernment reformers. I underscore the word "familiar." But all Communists are rebels; and there can be no doubt as to the overriding character of this civil war. In any event it is aimed at that government in China which has shed its blood, sweat, and tears against aggression and dictatorship for more than a decade. It is aimed at that government in China which is recognized by every other power on earth, and which asks our help in its extremity. It is to this government and this people that the pending bill again proposes to extend American succor in response to prayers for aid.

If and when we respond, Mr. President, to this plea, we are serving more than the humanities—great though these be amid a people with whom we have had long and vast cultural, educational, and religious ties. We are serving more than our traditional foreign policy, which never has failed to speak up for the integrity and the independence of China ever since our first treaty in 1844—particularly remembering Secretary of State Hay in 1900 and Secretary Stimson in 1932. We are also serving, Mr. President, our own unavoidable self-interest in international peace and security in an enormous far-eastern area which peculiarly involves the welfare and the future of the United States. Certainly no bill of particulars is necessary upon that score. Congress itself has been too obviously tender and receptive to this theme in recent months to require any further argument.

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This bill is our latest answer to these specifications and these demands. It puts the China program on the same timetable as the European program, taking the relative figure for 12 instead of 15 months, so that all these programs may confront simultaneous review next January. It thus authorizes an appropriation of $463,000,000. This sum is divided two ways. First, it makes $363,000,000 available for carefully screened relief and rehabilitation under the applicable provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, including the usual bilateral agreement with China, and under the general direction of the Administrator of that act. Second, it makes an additional $100,000,000 available as a grant on such terms as the President may determine. This can be used at China's option for military purposes and in the purchase of urgently needed military supplies. It is believed that this can greatly facilitate the delivery of our own surplus military supplies, at China's option, in the far-eastern area.

The Committee on Foreign Relations wishes to make it unmistakably clear, in this, as in all other relief bills, that there is no implication that American aid involves any continuity of obligation beyond specific, current commitments which Congress may see fit to make. This understanding is necessary in all foreign-aid legislation, not only in elementary prudence as respects our own resources, but also in justice to those whom we assist. We do not—we cannot—underwrite the future. Events are unpredictable in this tragically fluxing age. It is a duty to underscore this reservation in the case of China because we find here many imponderables as a result of the military, economic, and social pressures which have understandably undermined her stabilities, and prevented or postponed the internal reforms which even her surest friends readily concede to be not only desirable but essential for the Chinese people and for the Nationalist Government. But reforms without survival would be a disillusioning mirage.

General Chang Chun, President of the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist Government, frankly and courageously spoke of these necessities in a sturdy statement last January, from which I quote:

> The Chinese Government fully recognizes that, in order to secure the maximum benefit from external aid, an adequate and practicable program of domestic measures of self-help is needed. This program should at the beginning lay stress on financial and economic measures of immediate importance which will be followed or accompanied by certain other reforms in the fields of general administration and military reorganization.

General Chun then listed 10 of these vital necessities, and they are in the report which is on the desks of all Senators. They are more than ordinarily difficult of achievement in a country the size of China, comprising one-fifth of the world's population. By the same token the greater will be the glory of such efforts. The recognition of these necessities by the Nationalist Government itself is one of the stimulating and hopeful factors in this equation. The best friends of China will urge the relentless pursuit of these healing objectives. It is simple candor for us to take account of these facts as we turn again to China's assistance. But it would be a cruel distortion of paramount facts to subordinate the central purpose of this legislation to an overemphasis upon the difficulties and the handicaps which the Nationalist Government must overcome in these respects. The preservation of China's independence is prerequisite to the preservation or attainment of everything else. Liberty is prerequisite to progress.

Now I return briefly to the bill itself.

We cannot deal with the Chinese economy on an over-all basis, as we have done in the European recovery program. China is too big. The problem is too complicated. But we can serve some key needs with great effectiveness, and, in the unanimous opinion of the Foreign Relations Committee, we should and we do, under this proposed legislation. For example, we propose to help in respect to a probable food deficit of 2,000,000 tons for the coming year, having constantly in mind that China has so drained her foreign exchange that she will be hard pressed to procure essential imports needed for the continuation of her basic civilian economy. The tentative break-down of relief commodities is also shown in the revised committee report which is on the desks of all Senators. Limited appropriation, perhaps $60,000,000, is contemplated for key reconstruction projects. All commodities will be distributed,

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and all projects will proceed under the strict supervision of the Administrator of the Economic Recovery Act, and all applicable requirements of that act will be invoked; although, of course, it is clear that China cannot be tied in with the 16 European nations in this connection.

I turn now to the question of military aid. By way of background, I report the current military status in China. Because of shifting controls in disputed areas, it is impossible to be accurate. These are general estimates. The Chinese Communists control perhaps 25 per cent of the total area of China and perhaps 33 per cent of the population. The strength of the Communist armed forces is estimated at 1,150,000 regulars and 2,000,000 local militia. The Nationalist government announced 6 months ago that its armed forces numbered 3,800,000 men.

GREECE AND TURKEY

As in the case of Greece and Turkey, your Committee on Foreign Relations recognizes that military aid is necessary in order to make economic aid effective. It proposes to make military supplies available, at China's option. For this or any other purpose, at China's option, a grant of $100,000,000 is included in the bill. This implements a heavy program of transfers of military surplus, at nominal prices, already under way, and to be extended. Your committee believes, as a matter of elementary prudence, that this process must be completely clear of any implication that we are underwriting the military campaign of the Nationalist Government. No matter what our heart's desire might be, any such implication would be impossible over so vast an area. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, we prefer to leave the initiative, in respect to these particular funds, in the hands of the Nationalist Government. The current net result is no less effective. We want it to be no less effective. But we also want no mistake about the nature of our obligations. Congress must retain freedom of decision as events may recommend.

Under another law, the United States will continue to furnish military advisers to the Government of China at her request. At the present time this group consists of 572 officers and 921 enlisted men. This includes military police and weather and air transport personnel. None of this personnel commands Chinese troops nor engages in combat. Their capacity is advisory only. Combat units of American troops definitely are not involved. Nothing in the pending bill alters these limitations on these plans in any aspect. . . . .

Mr. MORSE, Republican, Oregon. On the basis of the analysis of the Wedemeyer report, would the distinguished Senator from Michigan say at this time that he believes the relief supplied by the United States to China, ever since V-J-Day, has in large measure gone to the aid of the common people of China?

Mr. VANDENBERG. An answer to the Senator's question requires a bill of particulars in respect to the question. The interest of the common people of China, in the judgment of the Senator from Michigan and, I am sure, in the judgment of the Senator from Oregon, rests first and fundamentally upon the maintenance of China's independence and the right of autonomy and self-determination. To whatever extent the aid furnished since V-J-Day has therefore either encouraged or helped sustain the Nationalist Government, I would say the answer is "yes," that it has been to the advantage of the people of China. Insofar as a break-down which would pursue the aid to specific objectives is concerned, I am afraid I cannot answer the Senator's question. . . . .

Mr. MORSE. During the course of the Senator's excellent speech this afternoon he particularly emphasized the obligation resting upon the Administrator or the administration of the aid program, to see to it that the aid we now propose to give China goes to the common people of China. I think the Senator can put me right if I am wrong, but I assume that . . . . the emphasis with which the Senator discussed this particular problem in his speech is probably based upon the fact that he, too, as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has heard testimony, as I have heard representations made to me, that too much of our funds and too many of our supplies which have gone to China in months past have not accrued to the benefit of the common people. Does the Senator think I am wrong in that observation?

Mr. VANDENBERG. I have no doubt in the world of the almost imponderable difficulties involved in the type of relief distribution in

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China which the Senator from Oregon and I both desire to see exist. Neither have I any doubt that there has been a progressive disintegration, as a result of the accumulated pressures in the last 8 years, in the adequacy of the system under which relief has been distributed. But my belief is that the clear and specific controls which are contemplated under the Economic Cooperation Act and which are contemplated to be extended to the distribution and control of supplies under this bill, will reduce to a minimum whatever hazard of the nature to which the Senator refers may exist.

Mr. MORSE. Were any representations made to the Committee on Foreign Relations by any witnesses as to the effect of black markets, corruption, bribery, pilferage, and tremendous waste which have characterized much of the distribution of relief supplies in China?

CORRUPTION

Mr. VANDENBERG. We had available to us the entire record taken by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, and there can be no doubt about the complete, or almost complete, disintegration of the Chinese fiscal system. I think that perhaps as of today the American dollar is measured in the equivalent of 500,000 Chinese dollars. Under such circumstances black markets are inevitable. It would be a unique situation if China were free of black markets, when we know that the entire European area, which is struggling back to its feet, is similiarly cursed with black markets. I should think that the black-market curse in China is greater than that in any other place in the world, in view of the fiscal-exchange relationships to which I have referred.

Mr. MORSE. If the Senator will permit me to make a brief comment on which I wish to base my next question, I should like to say that I have yet to interview the first American who has returned from China after extended observations in China who has not told me that in almost every part of China in which he or she traveled he or she found persons actually starving, and yet sometimes within the block, or around the corner, or two or three blocks away, there would be on the street for sale at black-market stands a good cross section of the various supplies we have been sending to China for the aid of the common people. Such reports have been so consistent and so uniform that I think they have added much to the query which I think is being asked all over America today, namely, what assurance have the taxpayers of America that by spending more and more millions of dollars for food and supplies for relief in China they are doing anything more than again filling the pockets of the group which is today in charge of the Nationalist Government of China? . . . .

On the basis of those reports I am convinced that something must be done this time to make clear to the National Government of China that it must do everything possible to cooperate with us in ending the type of waste, graft, and corruption which these reports uniformly indicate prevail at the present time in China. We must have assurance that there shall be an improvement in the distribution of our supplies. So I ask the Senator from Michigan if I am correct in assuming that his committee's answer to the problem is to be found in the language on page 11 of the report, where it is pointed out, starting with the last word on that page, and going to the top of page 12—

> The committee repeats that the Administrator is under obligation to see that this actually takes place—

Meaning, I assume, that this time we are saying to the National Government of China: "We shall insist that this relief go to the aid of the common people of China."

Am I correct in that assumption?

Mr. VANDENBERG. I think the Senator is totally correct in the very earnest dedication of the committee to that objective. I should like to comment a little further on the Senator's question, if he will permit me. I call his attention to the language of the committee report, on page 5, which frankly indicates that China's economy has deteriorated steadily since the defeat of Japan. Then I call attention particularly to the next sentence:

> The destruction of communications has isolated the resources from the centers of consumption and the ports.

I think that our committee was greatly impressed by the fact that among the other major

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difficulties confronted in achieving the precise result to which the Senator appropriately dedicates his hopes is the very general break-down in communications which makes it difficult to operate the most well-meaning plan that could be devised. It is for that reason, I say to the Senator from Oregon, that among other contemplations in the pending plan is the restoration of one major railroad line of communication which will greatly, it is hoped, reduce this particular handicap.

I think that in speaking of the necessity that this relief shall accrue to the advantage of the common people of China we cannot, as realists, ignore the utter size of the problem, the almost unbelievable area involved, and, above everything else, the break-down of all the instruments of communication, so that the worthiest purpose in the world confronts high difficulty in achieving these aspirations. . . . .

I can give the Senator no assurances as to net results respecting the vicissitudes of climate, and the like, in respect to native crops. I can give the Senator no assurances that the habits of a thousand years in this area are to be made over as a result of the legislation we are proposing. But I can give the Senator assurance, born of what I consider to be the very brave statement and action of General Chang Chun, president of the Executive Yuan of the Republic of China, which the Senator will find set out in some detail on pages 12 and 13 of the report. I am sure that statement of itself will give the Senator substantial reassurance regarding the attitudes of the beneficiaries of the plan. I can certainly give the Senator every assurance in the world that the administrators of the program will find themselves under an irresistibly compelling obligation to undertake to the maximum degree the objective which the Senator very rightly underscores.

Mr. MORSE. I think it is the last assurance that is of most importance in this discussion.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I think it is, too.

Mr. MORSE. The other assurances about which the Senator spoke I could not expect him to give to me, but in the course of his major remarks this afternoon—and I think this bears on one of the last observations he made—he did make the point, and I paraphrase him, that we have to look, of course, to our own economic resources to see how far we can go in our national relief program for China and other countries.

Mr. VANDENBERG. At all times.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator now points out that when we take into account the vastness of China, both from the standpoint of territory and from the standpoint of population, we cannot hope, of course, to bring to the common people of China all the aid that is going to be needed by them to eliminate the terrible economic and social conditions which exist in China.

Let me make a statement to the Senator, which I make only because I think re-emphasis of the point is important in this debate in view of the perplexity which confronts the American people today with regard to the situation in China. After V-J-Day we gave many millions of dollars' worth of war supplies, much of it consisting of food, clothing, and equipment, which could be used to sustain large numbers of the common men and women of China against the vicissitudes of the elements. Such supplies covered many acres of land in the various islands of the Pacific. And what happened? I think the American people should know some of the facts as to what happened in regard to those supplies. Many of them deteriorated and rotted, and were never moved off the islands.

A national corporation of the Chinese National government was formed, and many of those supplies, particularly heavy machinery and machinery that could be used in logging, road construction, and the like, have been sold back to American taxpayers at prices considerably higher than the prices which were charged for similar machinery by our own Surplus Property Administration. At least I have received such information and representations from several American sources. However, I want the facts about this matter, because if that is true, it needs to be looked into. . . . .

The dollars obtained by the Chinese National Government from those sales of supplies should be taken into account, it seems to me, when we compute and sum up our financial relief to China. I think we have to take into account the administrative policies which have been followed by this Chinese corporation in the disposal of American surplus property. I

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do not think it is fair or proper that certain political cliques or favored Chinese business groups should be allowed to make profits out of American relief supplies or American gifts to the Chinese people.

I am sure the Senator from Michigan will agree when I say there is great danger that what I say may be looked upon as an unfriendly act on my part toward the National Government of China. No one in this body, including the Senator from Michigan, has greater appreciation of and respect for the fight for freedom which the Chinese National Government waged during the Second World War than I have. However, I cannot condone what I understand have become totalitarian policies of the Chinese National Government in recent months.

In his remarks, the Senator from Michigan suggested that not all the rebels against the National Government are Communists, but that all the Communists are rebels. I agree with that observation in view of the reports I have received from China. I think it is proper to point out at this time that, at least from such reports as I am able to obtain, from people who I am satisfied are reliable, loyal Americans who have been living in China, some of whom have returned to this country, some of whom are still writing from China—there is growing resentment in China, on the part of people who are not Communists, against the practices of the National government in China. The result of growing opposition to the National government on the part of people who are not Communists is that a great many Americans are raising the question today as to whether, from the standpoint of totalitarianism, from the standpoint of governmental regimentation and dictation over and of the rights of the people, there is much difference between the policies of the Generalissimo and the policies of other totalitarians.

I do not think we can run away from this rising doubt as to what the governmental policies of the Generalissimo are with respect to the principles of freedom which we are defending the globe around. I think there is a responsibility resting on our government to make perfectly clear to leaders of governments who seek our aid that there are certain basic principles of freedom which they must support if they hope to have our aid, and there is none greater than the guaranty of freedom of choice to the rank and file of the people of a given country. I would ask the question, not of the Senator from Michigan, but a rhetorical question, How much freedom of choice is there in China today, even under the Chinese National Government? . . . .

Mr. VANDENBERG. The Senator from Oregon supports the pending proposal, I am sure, for substantially the same reasons that actuate me in my support of it.

No member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am sure, would undertake to say that the situation in China is comparable, in respect to the terms of democracy as we understand the word, with democracy as it is understood in those areas where it has been a reality for a much longer time.

FREEDOM OF CHOICE

It seems to me, I suggest to the Senator, that our judgments have to be relative in connection with the question of practical democracy. The Senator chose a phrase, which I particularly liked, to symbolize his entire objective. His phrase was, "the preservation of the freedom of choice." . . . .

I doubt whether that freedom of choice could possibly exist, in the terms that we in America would attach to the words, in any of the nations which are just coming into their first realization of the fruits of organized democracy. I agree that every emphasis upon freedom of choice must be made in our dealings with any government which we are undertaking to assist.

But we must—and at this point the Senator from Oregon would not for an instant disagree with me; I know him much too well—look at the other alternative in respect to freedom of choice, and in the opinion of the Senator from Michigan there will be no freedom of choice left to the 400,000,000 people of China if it falls behind the iron curtain of communism.

It seems to me at the moment, since there is a Nationalist Government, doubtful as some of its characteristics may be in terms of western morality—since there is a Nationalist Government which for 20 years has carried on the inspiration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in seeking to

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bring the Chinese people to a better day; since there is a Nationalist Government that has written a democratic constitution; since there is a Nationalist Government that has called free elections, and since the alternative at the moment is the total loss of any freedom of choice for any except those Communist autocrats who would control the conquest of China, I respectfully suggest that even on the basis submitted by my able friend from Oregon, those of us who are devoted to freedom of choice, those of us who are devoted to human rights and fundamental freedoms, find ourselves completely justified in supporting this effort for whatever it may be worth to encourage, under appropriate auspices, those who are struggling to preserve and promote freedom of choice for the Chinese people. . . . .

Mr. MORSE. The only caution I sought to indicate here today was a caution of my government—and I think it is a warranted caution—that we must make very clear to the National Government of China that there is much evidence to bear out the allegation that freedom of choice for which we are fighting and for which we are standing in the world today is not being granted to the degree that an ally of ours in a fight for liberty the world around should grant. That is the only major point I am trying to make.

I agree with the Senator from Michigan that once China falls behind the iron curtain of communism there is no liberty at all. But if she becomes a completely fascist state—and I am satisfied she is more fascist today than democratic—there will be no personal liberty for the people of China. It will be lost to the same degree under fascism as it would be lost under communism.

Mr. PEPPER, Democrat, Florida. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. VANDENBERG. I yield to the Senator from Florida.

Mr. PEPPER. In view of the enlightening discussion between the able Senator from Michigan and the able Senator from Oregon, and in order that it may be made clear that we are defending principles to which our people subscribe, I wonder whether the able chairman would accept an amendment to the bill: that its provisions and benefits shall not become available until the Secretary of State shall have found that at least the essential basic elements of democracy shall exist in the Nationalist Chinese Government?

Mr. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, the Senator knows the answer to his question before he asks it. He is laying down a rule of generalities which it would be totally impossible either to identify or to enforce.

Furthermore, the situation which we confront at the moment, in the judgment of the Senator from Michigan, is something of an emergency situation involving the far more fundamental question as to whether or not the masses of the Chinese people shall have a further chance to pursue the things which the Senator wants the Secretary of State to underwrite as having already occurred. . . . .

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President, I asked the question I asked a moment ago because I think it is very vital that we make it clear that we stand for two things. First, we stand at some Armageddon and say, "Beyond this point we will not retreat." We say that to all aggressors everywhere. I think that might be a statement of one side of our policy, but we must be unmistakably clear and put equal emphasis upon our declaration that we also have certain regard for principles. We must be very sure that we do not identify ourselves with any questionable motive or any questionable group, or any questionable attitude. So long as we are certain in our consciousness that we are right, and that we are associated with those who desire only to protect and defend the right, then I have no qualms about our course. That is the reason I think it is important that we make it clear, as the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] did a moment ago, that while we do not stand with Communists, we do not stand with Fascists, either, and that we do not stand with elements which are corrupt, or with those who have denied democracy to their own people. Let us associate ourselves with the democratic element, and say, "Yes; we will stand behind you against any kind of aggression or encroachment." But when we defend people who are not easily defensible, and governments whose defense has brought embarrassment even to this distinguished committee, if the record may be taken into account of what it said in its first report, and the modification

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of its report in the second instance, would we not a thousand times over strengthen our position if we were to lay down conditions which even our friends must meet if they are to receive our aid?

I distinguish the case of China from other cases. Even in Greece, where I believe the situation has not been altogether up to our standards, before we undertook to render aid we were able to point to an election which had been held, an election which had been examined by American observers as well as the observers of other countries. I have heard the able chairman declare upon this floor that that gave a degree of integrity to the Greek Government, even if it were monarchical in character, that it would not otherwise have possessed. We could say to the world that there was an election, that the people had an opportunity to vote. Our representatives scrutinized the vote, and they stated that it met moderate standards of adequacy. Consequently, we said, "Until there is a change, we will support this government."

But no sooner had we started our aid program in Greece than—I dare say due to our pressure—there was a so-called liberal government in power. It was a coalition government, but there was a displacement of the reactionary government, and there was the installation of the government of Sophoulis, who was the leader of the so-called liberal party. Today our aid is being given under this allegedly liberal government. I dare say our representatives are there to observe that there is some decent respect, at least, for the basic, fundamental principles of democracy. . . . .

Can we conscientiously say that that same condition exists in China? Is Chiang Kai-shek's government the one to which we wish to attach our flag and say it is ours as well as his? I thought we had been told time after time that if we were giving the money we could impose conditions. If we are to make it impossible for communists to participate in our aid, as we do, then can we not eliminate those who are on the other side, on the extreme right, the fascist-like side, especially when before mankind there is so much question as to their integrity, let alone their philosophic acceptability?



Alexander in *The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*

WHILE OUR BACKS WERE TURNED

So it seems to me that the moral background of our whole aid program would be immeasurably strengthened if we were to lay down the condition that, while we are not going to yield to the aggression of communism, we are not going to embrace as brothers the fascists or those who have philosophies of government which are not basically and essentially democratic in character. . . . .

Mr. WHERRY, Republican, Nebraska. I should like to know about China. It was my understanding then, and up until the time the E.R.P. program was passed in the Senate, that the economic approach was all that was necessary in the opinion of those who testified up to that time. I am not speaking of what has happened since. The question which I finally wish to get to is this: Has the situation changed? . . . .

What has happened in China? Is the situation very different from what it was when the other legislation was proposed? Is the situation today in Europe different from what it was when the Congress passed the European recovery program legislation? All I have to do is remind the distinguished Senator from Michigan of the testimony of Secretary Royall and of the colloquy the distinguished Senator from Michigan had with him—

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Mr. VANDENBERG. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. WHERRY. To make it unmistakably clear that at that time it was the economic approach, and that was all, and at that time we were given to understand that if we could provide the appropriations for the economic approach, we would not have to have the draft or we would not have to implement the program by taking steps along military lines. . . . .

If I properly interpret what it is proposed to do, we are appropriating $100 million which we know will probably be used by the Chinese Government for military purposes.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I would not withdraw any economic program simply because it might require a supplement of a different character. The situation changes from day to day. The necessity for the emphasis in our answer changes from day to day. But I think the record stands clear that it is highly desirable in the present instance, narrowing the issue to the particular issue now pending before the Senate, that this bill should pass for the sake of its contribution not only to the physical resources of our great Chinese friends, but also to their psychology in connection with a global challenge to the hopes by which free men live and the dedications for which we have fought.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator be patient enough for me to ask one more question?

Mr. VANDENBERG. I am glad to yield to the Senator.

Mr. WHERRY. I think that the China loan is related to E.R.P. if, for no other reason, that in the parliamentary situation which will come about through the passage of these bills in the Senate, which are included in the omnibus bill which will come from the House.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I am sorry, but I did everything I could to prevent that situation.

Mr. WHERRY. I understand that. For that reason, when it is considered by the conferees, I think it will be found that it is not an unrelated matter. That is one of the reasons I think the question is a proper one, not only with regard to China, but with regard to E.R.P.

Mr. VANDENBERG. Any question which the Senator asks is a proper question, so far as I am concerned.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator. Would the Senator consider that he has made up his mind that the alternative course of supplemental aid, besides economic aid, is now warranted? Does the Senator see what I mean?

Mr. VANDENBERG. No; I do not see what the Senator means. Does the Senator mean, do I favor selective service and universal military training? Is that the question?

Mr. WHERRY. The distinguished Senator used the words "an alternative which requires supplemental aid in addition to economic aid," whatever that may be, in the China aid bill.

Mr. VANDENBERG. The Senator is quite correct. That refers to the $100 million which at the option of China can be used by her to purchase military supplies.

Mr. WHERRY. Has the Senator come into possession of any facts, or have witnesses testified before his committee as to any serious facts, which justify the distinguished Senator's feeling that not only the economic approach, but the alternative approach should be used in handling the situation in Europe?

Mr. VANDENBERG. In China.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator has already explained the situation with respect to China. I am asking with reference to Europe.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I shall not undertake this afternoon to pass judgment on the question of our supplemental obligations in Europe in our own self-interest. It is beyond the wit of man to anticipate what the situation may ultimately require. I do not know the answer. It is in the lap of the gods and is dependent upon events. I shall cross that bridge when I come to it.

Mr. WHERRY. It will have to be crossed, will it not, in the conference committee? In the omnibus bill is there not aid other than economic aid?

Mr. VANDENBERG. Only in the case of Greece and Turkey, which is a continuation of the original program.

Mr. WHERRY. I wish to thank the Senator for the information he has given. I am still groping for more evidence to justify the

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demands of the administration relative to the end results which are to be obtained.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I am sure that is entirely the fault of the Senator from Michigan, it being unable to meet the desire of the Senator for information, but in self-defense the Senator from Michigan will say that he never before collided with quite such an appetite.

Mr. KEM, Republican, Missouri. Mr. President, approximately a year ago, on April 22, 1947, to be exact, the Senate passed the bill authorizing a $400 million "loan" to Greece and Turkey. This marked the initial phase of the so-called Truman doctrine to quarantine communism. The measure was opposed in this body by a number of its members. The opposition was based generally on four grounds.

OBJECTIONS

First. The plan bypassed the United Nations.

Second. The plan was in its essence a military program, although presented on a humanitarian basis.

Third. It is impossible to buy the good will of peoples with dollars.

Fourth. Our first concern should be to build a strong economy at home.

So far as the junior Senator from Missouri is concerned, each of these points is as valid today as when originally made. Nothing has occurred in the interval to cause him to think otherwise. These reasoned arguments apply equally to the second installment of $275 million of the Greek-Turkish program approved by the Senate last week, and also to the gift to China now under consideration. . . . .

The United States continues to adhere to the position that we are the sole hope of peace in this troubled world. The other members of the United Nations are in effect told that they shall have no voice in establishing peace in the Mediterranean. We shall carry on alone.

Mr. President, we are asked to direct our go-it-alone peacemaking efforts to another area in this troubled world; to vast, turbulent China, struggling in the throes of civil war. In his message to Congress on February 19, 1948, the President stated:

> The United States has long recognized the importance of a stable Chinese nation to lasting peace in the Pacific and the entire world. The primary objective of the United States is to bring about throughout the world the conditions of a just and lasting peace.

Mr. President, if that be the situation, and if that be our purpose, is it not a situation in which it is logical to utilize the facilities of the United Nations in an effort to secure a solution? If the peace of the world is threatened by the China problem, as the words of the President indicate, why should we not appeal to the United Nations before attempting to effect a solution of our own? The United States, in proceeding in this fashion in an effort to solve all the problems of the world, is steadily destroying the original and fundamental concept of the United Nations, upon which the hopes and aspirations of millions of our fellow citizens are centered.

Insofar as I am aware, there has been no action on our part to utilize the policing function of the United Nations in seeking a solution of the China problem. Did we not accept the United Nations as a means of world peace and security? Why, then, should the United States take unto itself the full responsibility of deciding how world peace should be maintained when the problem had been and has been specifically assigned to the United Nations from the outset?

If the United Nations is not sufficiently strong for the task, then let us use our resources and our energy to make it strong. If the fundamental Charter of the United Nations is inadequate or ineffective, let us direct our attention to the amendment of that Charter. . . . .

In the second place, Mr. President, I think it has been fully developed by the very frank and candid admissions of the senior Senator from Michigan, and by his colloquy with the able Senator from Nebraska, that the China plan is in its essence a military program, although presented, as before, as a humanitarian effort.

Some of those pressing at the last session of the Congress for the enactment of the $400 million Greek-Turkish so-called loan made efforts to camouflage its definite military

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character by presenting it primarily as a measure for economic assistance to those countries. . . . .

Now we are asked to provide aid to China, in the amount of $463 million. The committee bill states:

> It is the purpose of this act to provide immediate aid to China to relieve human suffering—

The same language again, Mr. President—

> to assist in retarding economic deterioration, and to afford the people of China an opportunity to initiate measures of self-help necessary to rebuilding the bases for more stable economic conditions.

So far as I have been able to determine, the bill does not mention military aid. However, the bill provides for an additional $100 million to be authorized to China through grants on such terms as the President may determine, and the report states that it may be assumed, and I think the Senator from Michigan has said that it may be assumed, that this $100 million will be used for military purposes.

Mr. President, there is a maxim in the law: "Facit per alium facit per se"—He that acts through another acts himself.

I do not think we need delude ourselves or continue in any false paradise to believe that when we grant money to a country those against whom our money is used will not consider us their military enemies. So we are asked to quarantine communism again—this time in China.

The initial phase of the program is presented to us on a humanitarian basis, but, Mr. President, I suppose none of us will be gullible again. Indeed, in the President's recent message on aid to China we find this significant remark:

> The financing of these essential commodity imports by the United States would permit the Chinese Government to devote its limited dollar resources to the most urgent of its other needs.

Of course it need not be pointed out that the most urgent of its other needs is of a military character. In other words, Mr. President, this project is war, and it is not conceived for purposes in anywise pacific.

We find the well-worn humanitarian appeal is resorted to once again in urging us, or enticing us, to commit ourselves to a new area in the world. Just as the original Greek and Turkish loan was mere window dressing for the expansion of our military frontier on the Dardanelles, so this proposed gift to China is mere camouflage for the establishment of a military beachhead somewhere in the vast reaches of China, to be held by the blood of American young men, if necessary. As Theodore Roosevelt once said, "You cannot shake your fist and then shake your finger." Once we are committed, it is only a question of time till the American soldier will be called upon to follow the American dollar. We shall hear again, as we heard last week from the distinguished senior Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], "We cannot turn back. We have got to see it through. The prestige of the American Nation is involved." . . . .

On March 12, 1948, Dr. Sun Fo, Vice President of China, expressed the apprehension of members of the Chinese Central Government over the extent of outside control that might be associated with the China-aid program. "China," said Dr. Sun Fo, "was eager to preserve her national sovereignty and self respect, and would insist upon the right to reject advice if it is not acceptable." I continue to quote from Dr. Sun Fo:

> Among our people there is apprehension about too much interference in running the country.

A number of foreign observers have conceived that lifting the ban on foreign inland shipping would help solve the transportation shortage, but Dr. Sun Fo said:

> We would object if we were asked to open our inland transportation system to foreign shipping.

Thus this sovereignty consciousness, creating a complication in terms of Nanking's dependence on foreign assistance, in the opinion of competent observers, is sure to prove a barrier in the way of an American effort to assist China out of its economic morass. In passing it may be said that it is almost certain to furnish a similar stumbling block in 16 countries of western Europe to which we have just voted aid.

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The United States has poured out billions upon billions of dollars and sent them down the European rat hole without appreciable results. But in our efforts to assist China we have been confronted, and are now confronted, by no mere rat hole. It is rather a bottomless pit, or an abysmal morass. In spite of all the money the United States has poured out, conditions in China have grown more and more desperate. The inflation of the currency is completely out of hand. . . . . Anarchy threatens to engulf the land. First-hand observers return with stories of corruption, waste, and incompetence from the top to the bottom of the Nationalist Government. The military situation there is equally deplorable. It has been stated that for every communist killed by the Central Government, four more are created by the unfair tax policies of the Central Government, its cruel police-state methods, and its failure to check inflation.

Our support of a regime that has grown more and more unpopular in the last year or so will reap for the United States only a lasting harvest of hatred.

Secretary Marshall in his testimony before the House committee on February 24, 1948, stated:

> For the main part, the solution of China's problems is largely one for the Chinese themselves. Local governments are often so corrupt that they are undependable for assistance in the administration of relief methods. The political control by long-entrenched groups is a great difficulty to be overcome in the restoration of China to economic stability.

Mr. President, if I correctly interpret the address of the President of the United States on this subject and the testimony of his Secretary of State in regard to it, the only thing expected from this measure is a breathing spell to help retard the present rapid rate of deterioration. No effective results are even hoped for. Yet, as in Greece and Turkey, once we have shaken our fist at the Communists in China, we shall find that we cannot then shake our finger, for economic aid admittedly will serve no useful purpose.

General Chennault has testified that substantial portions of the military equipment we have furnished to China have already fallen into the hands of the Communists. It is only a question of time when we shall receive requests to send American boys to do the job that our economic and military aid has not succeeded in doing. Shall we then be told by able and distinguished members of the Foreign Relations Committee that we cannot turn back, but that we have placed our hand at the plowshare and our prestige is at stake?

American military missions, Mr. President, already are accompanying American dollars into the far reaches of the earth. They are asked to accompany them in this connection. Are we ready to follow those missions with the cream of American manhood to defend putative frontiers on the Yangtze, the Dardanelles, the Oder, and the Hellespont?

Mr. President, let us turn again before we are told once more that our prestige has been involved and that we are committed. . . . .

Mr. JENNER, Republican, Indiana. I should like to ask the Senator from Missouri whether it has not always been the policy of our government to help China in an hour of need?

Mr. KEM. So far as I know we have never aided and abetted the Chinese government in any military project, in the entire history of the United States.

Mr. JENNER. Then does the Senator mean to say that this is a bill to provide military aid coupled with relief?

Mr. KEM. I mean to say it is to provide military aid to a large extent, and that the essential conception is military.

Mr. JENNER. What percentage of the appropriation for China would be applied to relief?

Mr. KEM. I think there is approximately $350 million for relief, and $100 million for military purposes. But it is stated in the report, perhaps very naively, that the economic aid given to the Government will enable it to turn to its more pressing necessities. So in effect, since the Chinese Government is at war, all her aid is of a military character.

Mr. JENNER. Assuming that the $450 million were truly applied directly to relieve the suffering and famishing Chinese, does the Senator have any statistical or other basis of fact that would enable him to inform the

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Senate what the appropriation would represent by way of aid per person in China?

Mr. KEM. I think, roughly, it would be $1 a person.

Mr. JENNER. One dollar a person a year?

Mr. KEM. Yes, on this grant; and of course this is merely a start. They will be back. The Greek-Turkish program lasted a little less than a year. There is no reason, I suppose, to expect this will last longer than that.

Mr. JENNER. Then would the Senator say that the granting of $100 million for military aid is committing us to a military program in China that in substance means that we must finance the present Chinese government until either it is successful or drives communism from its borders?

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, I can only say to the Senator from Indiana, I think we may be guided by the lamp of experience. When we sent lend-lease aid to the embattled Allies of Europe we were told that it in no sense involved us in war. Yet, within only a few months, American boys were found fighting all over the world. I do not happen to recall a case of any power that aided and abetted another with money that did not sooner or later become involved with the wars of that power. It would seem to me to be an essential "chain reaction," to use the striking phrase of the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. JENNER. I thank the Senator.

Mr. KNOWLAND, Republican, California. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEM. I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Perhaps the Senator is going to touch on it later in his remarks, but I was wondering if he does not recognize what the significance might be if 450 million Chinese came under the complete domination of the Communists, either Russia herself or a Communist satellite establishment of Russia in China, and if that 450 million man-power was made available to the two-hundred-and-some-odd million within the boundaries of the Soviet Union itself, plus the additional millions that have been forcibly taken behind the iron curtain. I am wondering if the Senator does not realize that that would have tremendous significance upon the ultimate security of the United States, and that while it might not present a problem for this generation in the next year or two, for our children it might present a problem that would be far greater than the problem of the civilized world at the time of Genghis Khan.

Mr. KEM. I agree entirely with the Senator from California. I doubt, Mr. President, if there is a member of this body who has not given that very possibility hours, and I may say nights, of sleepless thought and consideration. I doubt if there is a member of this body —and I say it reverently—who has not approached it with prayerful consideration. Yet, Mr. President, I have no reason to believe from anything I have ever been able to read in recorded history that the puny efforts now proposed will prevent that result taking place if it is in the womb of time.

Mr. HAWKES, Republican, New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEM. I yield to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. HAWKES. The Senator referred to the puny efforts. That was only speaking relatively, because I know the Senator does not think of $21 million plus $24 million that has been given and loaned on unsound loans since the end of the war.

Mr. KEM. I was referring to the present sum of $1 per person provided in the bill.

Mr. HAWKES. I realize what the Senator was referring to, but what I wanted to emphasize was that that need which to the world may seem puny from our national standpoint may be very enormous to us as an individual nation. Does the Senator realize that?

Mr. KEM. Yes. . . .

Mr. President, time will not permit any extensive discussion of the vacillating policies we have already pursued in China. Our inept, vacillating policy toward the Central Government in China has succeeded in completely confusing both the Chinese and the American people, together with their representatives in Congress.

At one time, in the period after Pearl Harbor, the United States extended aid to both the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists in their fight against the Japanese. In October, 1944, with the recall of General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell at General Chiang Kai-shek's request, United States support was

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thrown behind the Nationalist Government. At approximately the same time Mr. Patrick Hurley was appointed Ambassador to China, but a year later, on November 2, 1945, he resigned his post with fiery blasts at the State Department for sabotaging his efforts to prevent the collapse of the Nationalist Government.

In a State Department bulletin issued on November 18, 1945, we find this statement:

> It is neither our purpose nor desire to become involved in the internal affairs of China. . . .

By this time full-scale civil war had begun between the Nationalists and the Communists. President Truman then sent General Marshall as a special envoy to China, with the personal rank of ambassador. His task was to bring about peace and unity by broadening the Central Government to include the representatives of the large and well-organized group who were then without any voice in the government of China.

President Truman, on December 16, 1945, stated:

> The United States is cognizant that the present National Government in China is a one-party government.

He went on to say in general that peace, unity, and democratic reform in China would be furthered if the basis of the government were broadened to include other political elements in the country. He further stated:

> In line with its often-expressed views regarding self-determination, the United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate.

Special Envoy Marshall, however, was unsuccessful in effecting a reconciliation between the ruling party and the Communists, and on January 6, 1947, he returned to Washington to stay, being highly critical of the political and military reactionaries in the ruling party and also of the dyed-in-the-wool Communists. President Truman, in a policy statement on December 16, 1946, had acknowledged the failure of American efforts to secure peace in China.

After what has been described as General Marshall's first failure, the tempo of American withdrawal from China was accelerated. Perhaps one of the factors that may have hastened the United States decision to quit China was the obvious and unabated hostility of the Chinese people to the American forces then in China. Thus our vacillating policy at the beginning of 1947 reflected a hands-off attitude toward the Chinese situation, and the administration directed our attention to the Greek-Turkish problem, leaving the Chinese primarily to look after themselves.

Then, in July, 1947, the President sent General Wedemeyer to China as his personal representative to survey the situation. The general completed his mission in September, and returned to this country. He submitted a confidential report of his findings to the President and the Secretary of State. That report has never been released to the public or to the Congress. It has been described as too hot to handle from the State Department point of view. At any rate, it was suppressed.

It would seem, Mr. President, that before the Congress embarks on such a dangerous program as is called for by the China plan, the least we can do is to place ourselves in possession of all the available facts. We ought to have all the available facts before we reach a decision. Clearly our judgment can be no better than our information. . . . .

Mr. LUCAS, Democrat, Illinois. As I understand, the Senator is against the measure now pending before the Senate?

Mr. KEM. The perspicacity of the Senator from Illinois is quite remarkable.

Mr. LUCAS. Of course, I did not think the Senator from Missouri would go into the question of the perspicacity of the Senator from Illinois, but if he wants to debate that subject, we will go into it later.

Mr. KEM. I shall be glad to discuss it with the Senator later.

Mr. LUCAS. Yes; we can do that.

Assuming to be true what the Senator from Missouri has said about our foreign policy in China, what does the Senator suggest we do, if anything, with respect to China?

Mr. KEM. If the Senator from Illinois will

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bear with me, I shall reach that point in the remarks I have to make, and I think the Senator, with the perspicacity he has demonstrated, will have no difficulty in determining exactly what I think we ought to do.

Mr. LUCAS. The only reason I propound the inquiry now is that I am afraid perhaps the Senator will not finish this afternoon. I am not going to be here tomorrow, and I wanted to find out exactly what the Senator had in mind with respect to what we ought to do, if anything, in regard to China. It is a perfectly proper question, and I am really interested, because I agree, to a certain extent, with some of the things the Senator has said. I know that our policy in China has not been a total success; but I should like to find out from the brilliant Senator from Missouri exactly what we can do, if anything, with respect to China. That is the point.

Mr. KEM. In case my remarks carry over until tomorrow, and in case the able and brilliant Senator from Illinois is not present in the Chamber, I shall obtain his address from the Secretary to the minority and send him a copy of the *Congressional Record* by air mail.

Mr. LUCAS. That is exactly the way many Senators do when they are asked a real question which gets to the meat of the situation, and when they are asked what they would do. They tell us that they will send us a copy of the speech the following day. Now is the time for the Senator from Missouri to tell the country what he would do with respect to our foreign policy in China, and not wait until tomorrow.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, I prefer to develop my argument in my own way. I am unable to accept the well-meant suggestions of the able Senator from Illinois.

Mr. LUCAS. It is always easy, Mr. President, to tear down a house. Many men who can tear down a house cannot build one. I should like to have the Senator tell us about a policy for China.

Mr. KEM. I have already told the Senator that I expect to suggest a policy which will be so definite and clear-cut that even the Senator from Illinois will have no difficulty in understanding it.

Mr. LUCAS. I doubt it. . . . .

Mr. KEM. Perhaps some Senators will say that the Senator from Missouri does not appreciate the significance of this One World in which we live. Perhaps it will be said that the Senator from Missouri is lacking in appreciation of the atomic age. Perhaps I shall be reminded by Senators that modern means of communication have brought Europe and America and the rest of the world close together. But it seems to me that the new American policy, developed and implemented and put into action in the light of these developments in the world of the physical sciences, has had a rather thorough test. We have fought two world wars. We have spilled a tremendous amount of American blood. As a minor matter, we have spilled a great deal of money and natural resources. We destroyed the Kaiser, only to raise up Hitler. We destroyed Hitler, only to raise up Stalin. . . . .

The China-aid plan now under consideration is diametrically and utterly opposed to the teachings of the Father of His Country. I hope we shall not lightly disregard those teachings. I hope we shall apply them without fear or favor.

Now I come to the plan which I have to suggest. There is nothing new or novel about it. The fact of the matter is that I have previously presented it on the floor of the Senate. I regret greatly that the able and distinguished Senator from Illinois, who pressed me for my plan just a few moments ago, is not now present, but I hope he will read in the *Congressional Record* what I have to say at this time, and I hope he will consider it for what it may be worth.

I have three proposals, and I urge them again for the careful consideration of the Senate and our fellow Americans:

First, let us stop meddling in the internal, governmental affairs of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Second, let us drive the Communists and fellow travelers from employment under the government of the United States and make it as difficult as possible for them to return.

Third, while we still have strong resources, let us spend as much as may be needed to build a national defense so strong that neither Russia nor any other aggressor nation will dare attack us.

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Mr. President, for those reasons I shall vote against the pending bill. . . . .

Mr. LANGER, Republican, North Dakota. Mr. President, what is proposed to be given by the bill now pending is not the only money China will have received. I have here the record. Communism has been fought in China very hard, if the amount of money China has been given is any criterion. . . . .

How much would any Senator suppose has been given to the Chinese—not to our veterans, not to our farmers, not to our teachers, not to our aged, but to the Chinese in China? Aside from the amount they will receive under the bill now being considered, under United States post-war foreign assistance there has been given since the war $1,099,000,000, not counting what is proposed to be given to China today. . . . .

Let us consider another angle. I would gladly follow the Foreign Relations Committee and I would gladly follow the State Department, but the trouble is that they are wrong practically all the time. One event following another event proves them to be wrong. Only yesterday the head of the Flying Tigers, General Chennault, said that the entire Chinese situation could have been cleaned up several years ago. . . . .

The total shows that to date we have given to China $2,905,800,000, or five times the assessed value of every acre of land and every piece of property in five states the size of North Dakota. I make the prediction that a year from now they will be back asking for a billion dollars more. . . . .

Mr. CONNALLY, Democrat, Texas. Conditions in China have been, as is well known, greatly disturbed. For 8 years she was at war with Japan, invaded and subjugated, and she is now involved in an internecine civil war which has brought great suffering to her people and has placed upon the Central Government of China great burdens and difficulties which it is hardly able to bear.

The sum which is involved is not, I grant, sufficient to solve all the problems of China. It will be only an incentive, a rather substantial one, in a way, and an encouragement to China to know that the great Republic across the seas is her friend and wants to see her rehabilitated and reinstated in her ancient power. . . . .

Most of the sum of money to be authorized is for the actual necessities of life for the teeming millions of China. There is an item of $100 million which is not earmarked, for good and substantial reasons. We cannot, in a program of this nature, anticipate every need or necessity which may arise. We cannot tie the hands of the Administrator by requiring that he must furnish this, that, and the other, and nothing else. It is in the nature of an outright grant to China for her use, under her own responsibility, for whatever great and critical need may arise.

There is not a word in the bill regarding military supplies or military aid. It is, of course, entirely probable that the $100 million grant may, if the exigency should arise, be utilized by the Central Government in China for the purchase of munitions, equipment, and arms. It is as important to protect China against invasion and subjugation as it is to protect the bodies of her people by providing the food which is to be sent to her under other provisions of the bill.

The committee unanimously reported the bill. There is wide sentiment throughout the country in favor of furnishing aid to China. This measure is the best plan or device we could bring about in the committee to extend aid to China, without making hard and fast commitments which we did not feel it was wise to make.

I am sure we all read in the newspapers recently that Chiang Kai-shek issued a public statement appealing for the aid of the peoples of the world, stating that China was at the very door of destruction, on the brink of disaster. We have heard his appeal and are responding to it. We are extending aid, not in the proportions that many persons would desire, but aid of a very substantial character which, in an hour of crisis, of danger, and of need may be of great assistance to China, because in every issue there is always a point at which an inconsiderable force is sufficient to balance the scale in favor of one side or the other.

So, Mr. President, I hope the Senate will, by a resounding vote, support this measure and give government sanction to trying to aid

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a great people of a great nation which has been our traditional friend, and to which we have extended generous aid in the past. We hope this aid will be of substantial assistance in furthering the ambitions of China for democracy and free government, and in rehabilitating her economy, so that she may be put in such a position that she may, through her own resources and by her own devices, regain the place in the economy and the civilization of the world to which her history entitles her. . . . .

Mr. PEPPER. What has troubled me regarding this particular case more than has any other thing is the matter of those with whom we are required to be associated in the assistance we give, and whether the very fact that the people we are expected to assist are themselves vulnerable subjects us to a criticism which we do not and should not deserve. I feel with all my heart that the only solution of the problems of China ultimately is an effective working democracy in that country.

I feel that the effective answer to communism is an effective democracy, and I know of no place in the world where that is more true than in China.

I am not going to dispute the allegation that, in some parts of the world there appears to be, by the overwhelming weight of the evidence, an element of force behind the persuasion of communism. Wherever force appears there can be no question, of course, about the necessity of interposing a counterforce of equal power to prevent aggression, and "to preserve the freedom of choice," words used this morning in the debate, for the people under assault.

I think we must in fairness say that the evidence has not been such with respect to China as it has been with respect to Greece. There has been a constant assertion that in Greece aid was given across the border by a neighboring country. That fact has been supported by the testimony of a duly accredited mission of the United Nations. So far as I know, there has been no similar United Nations commission which has made a study of the situation in north China and made a comparable report. I do not know of a United Nations recommendation which today demands the kind of support which we are asked to give to the Nationalist Government in China.

If the aid from across the border, which we are told exists in Greece, is not being given today in China, I would not of course wish to interpose military force, and I am glad that the committee has made it clear that we are not, legislatively, at least, adding military to the economic aid we provide in the measure before us.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PEPPER. I yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. CONNALLY. Anything which supports human beings in the way of food and the like in a measure is military aid, if the people are in the field fighting.

Mr. PEPPER. I was distinguishing military from economic assistance.

Mr. CONNALLY. Very well.

Mr. PEPPER. What I want to say is that I have noted particularly in the pending measure the authority provided for American administrators to see to it that the aid given is properly distributed. I was very much gratified to observe that. In fact, I notice in the recommendation of the committee that the Administrator, who has the same authority with respect to the other Marshall plan countries, shall have the power, and I presume the final say-so, as to the distribution of the aid. I feel very much better about it after observing that recommendation of the committee, and the interpretation of the bill, that it will finally be up to an American Administrator to see to it that what we give by way of aid is properly distributed to the Chinese people, and is not subject to exploitation by those who would even be willing to accentuate the grief of their fellow countrymen to assuage their own appetites for greed and avarice. I am concerned about our going further than that. . . . .

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and read the third time.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is, Shall the bill pass?

The bill S. 2393 was passed,

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